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IN RE MARRIAGE OF BIRNBA UM: MODIFYING CHILD
CUSTODY ARRANGEMENTS BY IGNORING
THE RULES OF THE GAME
I. INTRODUCTION
Courts must often make difficult child custody decisions following
the dissolution of marriages.' In these instances, courts act not only as
mediators between the parents and themselves, but also as mediators be-
tween the parents and the child.2 The courts' goal in child custody suits
is to determine the living arrangements that will most benefit the child.3
The issues involved are complex-mainly because courts must examine a
variety of factors in making child custody decisions.4
Typically, once trial courts issue custody orders, it is very difficult
for appellate courts to modify them. This difficulty arises in modifying
original custody orders because courts are required to adhere to strict
requirements established by statutes and case law.5 These laws require
1. See infra notes 83-140 and accompanying text for a discussion of the initial custody
award.
2. See, e.g., Birnbaum v. Birnbaum (In re Marriage of Birnbaum), 211 Cal. App. 3d
1508, 1511 n.4, 260 Cal. Rptr. 209, 212 n.4 (1989) (parents love their children but neither can
see past their particular egocentric needs to acknowledge full value of other parent to child);
McLoren v. McLoren, (In re Marriage of McLoren), 202 Cal. App. 3d 108, 114, 247 Cal.
Rptr. 897, 900 (1988) (court erroneously modified custody to joint custody where parents had
ongoing inability to cooperate in their parenting responsibilities due to severe hostility toward
each other, at times erupting into physical violence, and to virtual absence of any communica-
tion between them).
3. See, e.g., Burchard v. Garay, 42 Cal. 3d 531, 540, 724 P.2d 486, 492-93, 229 Cal. Rptr.
800, 806-07 (1986) (custody determination must reflect how best to provide continuity of at-
tention, nurturing and care); O'Connell v. O'Connell (In re Marriage of O'Connell), 80 Cal.
App. 3d 849, 858, 146 Cal. Rptr. 26, 32 (1978) (right to custody and control of child is right to
companionship of child and right to make decisions regarding his or her care, control, educa-
tion, health, and religion); see CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4600, 4608 (West Supp. 1990).
4. Factors that courts consider when making child custody decisions include the follow-
ing: primary caretaker, time available for parenting, stability of environment, mental capacity,
health, visitation, child's welfare, and child preferences. Burchard, 42 Cal. 3d at 540, 724 P.2d
at 492-93, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 806-07 (custody determination must reflect how best to provide
continuity of attention, nurturing and care); Kim v. Kim, 208 Cal. App. 3d 364, 370-71, 256
Cal. Rptr. 217, 220 (1989) (father denied custody because he shot wife and molested daughter);
Detrich v. Dorothy H. (In re Jack H.), 106 Cal. App. 3d 257, 269, 165 Cal. Rptr. 646, 653
(1980) (court should consider child's wishes); Matthews v. Matthews (In re Marriage of Mat-
thews), 101 Cal. App. 3d 811, 818, 161 Cal. Rptr. 879, 883 (1980) (child's welfare is para-
mount); Columbo v. Columbo, 71 Cal. App. 2d 577, 583-84, 162 P.2d 995, 998 (1945) (mother
suffered from recurring insanity and lower court erred in awarding her custody); see infra
notes 102-40 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 141-78 and accompanying text.
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the party requesting modification to show that it is in the best interests of
the child6 to change the pre-existing custody arrangement, as well as to
prove that there has been a change in circumstances.7 This Note exam-
ines Birnbaum v. Birnbaum (In re Marriage of Birnbaum),' in which a
California Court of Appeal ignored these requirements. The Birnbaum
court was able to evade these established rules because of the vague statu-
tory definition of joint custody and the definition's effect on the standards
for modification of such custody orders.9 In Birnbaum, the appellate
court upheld the trial court's modification of the custody agreement by
avoiding the "modification" requirements, and instead labeling the order
a "rearrangement of the children's residential timetable.""0 Legal analy-
sis suggests, however, that this change in the parenting arrangement was,
in fact, a modification, and that the court improperly avoided the strict
laws governing modification of child custody agreements."
This Note examines and criticizes the Birnbaum decision. By not
following the applicable judicial precedent and statutes, the Birnbaum
court failed to advance the policy concerns underlying child custody
laws. These laws were designed to guard the child's best interest by fos-
tering stable custody arrangements as well as judicial economy. 2 The
author argues that courts, in child custody cases, should follow the statu-
torily and judicially defined modification requirements. These require-
ments, when correctly enforced, protect the important interests
underlying child custody cases. To ensure that these policies are fur-
thered, the author proposes that the California legislature adopt more
precise definitions of joint custody and more specific limitations on child
custody modification.
II. BACKGROUND
To understand the problems created by the Birnbaum court's re-
fusal to apply traditional modification laws, this section provides an over-
view of several legal concepts. First, this section defines the types of
custody awards available to parents and children. Second, it explains
6. See infra notes 144-52 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 153-61 and accompanying text.
8. 211 Cal. App. 3d 1508, 260 Cal. Rptr. 210 (1989).
9. See supra notes 271-83 and accompanying text.
10. Birnbaum, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 1513, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 213.
11. See infra notes 246-62 and accompanying text.
12. See Burchard, 42 Cal. 3d at 535, 724 P.2d at 488, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 802; Carney v.
Carney (In re Marriage of Carney), 24 Cal. 3d 725, 730-31, 598 P.2d 36, 38, 157 Cal. Rptr.
383, 385 (1979); Connolly v. Connolly, 214 Cal. App. 2d 433, 436, 29 Cal. Rptr. 616, 617-18
(1963); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4600, 4608.
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how California courts determine initial custody orders. Third, this back-
ground sets forth the traditional modification requirements for child cus-
tody arrangements.
A. Child Custody in General
Child custody refers to the relationships between parents and chil-
dren13 and encompasses all qualities of these relationships.14 Frequently,
custody has been considered coextensive with residency. 5 Custody in-
cludes the right to establish a child's domicile, as well as other rights and
obligations associated with the parent-child relationship, such as child
care, control, education, health and religion. 6
When divorcing parents are unable to agree on custody arrange-
ments, judges are faced with the difficult task of determining which cus-
tody arrangement is in the child's best interests. 7 In making this
determination, judges should select an arrangement that will foster posi-
tive child development" and lessen the severe emotional and psychologi-
cal trauma of parental divorce. 9 Section 4600 of the California Civil
13. Porter & Walsh, The Evolution of California's Child Custody Laws: A Question of
Statutory Interpretation, 7 Sw. U.L. Rnv. 1, 2-3 (1975) (citing H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC
RELATIONS 573 (1968)).
14. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4600(b), 4608 (West Supp. 1990); Comment, Joint Custody:
An Alternative for Divorced Parents, 26 UCLA L. REv. 1084, 1086 (1979).
15. Porter & Walsh, supra note 13, at 3.
16. See Walker v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. 3d 112, 134, 763 P.2d 852, 866, 253 Cal. Rptr.
1, 15 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3186 (1989); Burge v. City of San Francisco, 41 Cal. 2d
608, 617, 262 P.2d 6, 12 (1953); Lerner v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. 2d 676, 681, 242 P.2d 321,
323 (1952); O'Connell v. O'Connell (In re Marriage of O'Connell), 80 Cal. App. 3d 849, 858,
146 Cal. Rptr. 26, 32 (1978); Porter & Walsh, supra note 13, at 3; Comment, supra note 14, at
1086 n.16.
17. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(b). In determining the best interests of the child, courts
should consider the health, safety, and welfare of the child, any history of abuse against the
child, and the nature and amount of contact the child will receive from both parents. Id.
§ 4608(a), (b), (c); see Dupaix, Best Interests Revisited: In Search of Guidelines, 3 UTAH L.
REv. 651, 651 (1987).
18. See Sam E. v. Stahl (Guardianship of Claralyn S.), 148 Cal. App. 3d 81, 85-86, 195
Cal. Rptr. 646, 649 (1983); see also Dupaix, supra note 17, at 655 (determination of custody
rights goes to very heart of child's identity and fundamental bond to its parents, and families
establish lives based on these judgments).
19. See, eg., Kim v. Kim, 208 Cal. App. 3d 364, 371, 256 Cal. Rptr. 217, 220-21 (1989)
(father denied custody because he shot wife and molested daughter); McLoren v. McLoren, (In
re Marriage of McLoren), 202 Cal. App. 3d 108, 114, 247 Cal. Rptr. 897, 900 (1988) (court
erroneously modified custody to joint custody where parents had ongoing inability to cooper-
ate in their parenting responsibilities due to severe hostility toward each other, at times erupt-
ing into physical violence, and to virtual absence of any communication between them); see
Comment, supra note 14, at 1085. See generally J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT,
BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1979) [hereinafter BEYOND THE BEST INTER-
ESTs] (effects on children caused by disruption of parent-child relationship in divorce and
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Code2° states that the legislature's purpose in holding child custody pro-
ceedings is "to assure minor children of frequent and continuing contact
with both parents after the parents have separated or dissolved their mar-
riage, and to encourage parents to share the rights and responsibilities of
child rearing ... .."21 Thus, the legislature intended to preserve the fam-
ily unit22 and encourage judges to select an arrangement in furtherance
of this goal.
1. Custodial preferences
Section 4600 defines the order of preference in granting custody of a
minor child to an adult.23 Custody awards are granted according to the
court's determination of what is in the child's best interests.24 First, cus-
tody is awarded to both parents jointly or, alternately, to either parent.25
Second, if custody is not awarded to either parent, it may be awarded to
the person(s) "in whose home the child has been living in a wholesome
change in their environment); J. WALLERS7IEIN & J. KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP
(1980) (studies on effects of divorce on children and parents).
20. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(a).
21. Id.
22. S. 477, 1979-80 Leg., Reg. Sess., 1979 Cal. Stat. 449. The California legislature stated
that the purpose of the joint custody law was "to assure minor children of close and continuing
contact with both parents after the parents have separated or dissolved their marriage." Id.;
accord, CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(a) (way to preserve family unit and the child-parent relation-
ship is to maintain contact between parents and children).
23. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(b).
24. Id The custody award depends on what is best for the child, a standard broadly
defined in section 4608 of the California Civil Code:
In making a determination of the best interest of the child in any proceeding under
this title, the court shall, among any other factors it finds relevant, consider all of the
following:
(a) The health, safety, and welfare of the child.
(b) Any history of abuse against the child. As a prerequisite to the considera-
tion of allegations of abuse, the court may require substantial independent corrobora-
tion including, but not limited to, written reports by law enforcement agencies, child
protective services or other social welfare agencies, courts, medical facilities, or other
public agencies or private nonprofit organizations providing services to victims of
sexual assault or domestic violence....
(c) The nature and amount of contact with both parents.
Id. § 4608(a)-(c).
25. Id. § 4600(b); see, e.g., Miller v. Hudmon (In re Miller), 244 Cal. App. 2d 454, 458-59,
53 Cal. Rptr. 211, 214 (1966); Marlow v. Wene, 240 Cal. App. 2d 670, 676, 49 Cal. Rptr. 881,
885 (1966). The parenting plan adopted by the court must also be gender neutral. CAL. CIV.
CODE § 4600(b)(1). Thus, one parent cannot be preferred as custodian on the basis of that
parent's sex. Id.; see also Speelman v. Superior Court, 152 Cal. App. 3d 124, 128-29, 199 Cal.
Rptr. 784, 786 (1983) (both male and female parents have equal custody rights). For a discus-
sion of maternal preference prior to enactment of section 4600, see Speelman, 152 Cal. App. 3d
at 128, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 786. Now the sole concern in a custody determination is the best
interests of the child. Burchard v. Garay, 42 Cal. 3d 531, 536, 724 P.2d 486, 489, 229 Cal.
Rptr. 800, 803 (1986).
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and stable environment. ' 26 Next, custody is awarded to any other per-
son(s) "deemed by the court to be suitable and able to provide adequate
and proper care and guidance for the child."'2 7 Before the court grants
custody to a person other than the parent, it must find that a custody
award to a parent would be detrimental to the child and that an award to
a nonparent is required to serve the child's best interests.2"
2. Sole and joint custody
Section 4600.5 defines several types of custody awards, including
sole custody, joint physical and joint legal custody.29 There is neither a
statutory preference nor a statutory presumption for or against any of
thesd particular custody arrangements.30 Therefore, trial courts have
wide discretion in selecting a particular parenting plan.31
a. sole custody
Sole custody grants all custodial rights and responsibilities to one
parent, subject to the other parent's visitation rights.32 There are two
types of sole custody: sole physical custody and sole legal custody. Sole
physical custody means that a child must "reside with and under the
supervision of one parent, subject to the power of the court to order visi-
26. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(b)(2); accord Urband v. Urband (In re Marriage of Urband),
68 Cal. App. 3d 796, 798, 137 Cal. Rptr. 433, 434 (1977) (trial court has wide discretion in
custody determination); Coddington v. Coddington, 210 Cal. App. 2d 96, 100, 26 Cal. Rptr.
431, 433 (1962) (trial court is allowed wide latitude in exercising its discretion).
27. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(b)(3); accord Urband, 68 Cal. App. 3d at 798, 137 Cal. Rptr.
at 434; Coddington, 210 Cal. App. 2d at 100, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 433.
28. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(c); see, ag., Roche v. Roche, 25 Cal. 2d 141, 142-44, 152 P.2d
999, 1000 (1944) (physical custody to grandparents was awarded to nonparent and could not
be made unless parent who opposed award was found unfit); Stauffacher v. Stauffacher, 227
Cal. App. 2d 735, 737-38, 39 Cal. Rptr. 31, 33 (1964) (award to father for placement in foster
home held award to nonparent); Loomis v. Loomis, 89 Cal. App. 2d 232, 238-39, 201 P.2d 33,
36 (1948) (custody award to father who intended to leave children with their aunts in Califor-
nia while he resided in Maryland held award to nonparent). But see Booth v. Booth, 69 Cal.
App. 2d 496, 501-02, 159 P.2d 93, 96 (1945) (children resided with their grandparents, which
was also father's residence, when father was stationed overseas in armed forces was not cus-
tody award to nonparent).
29. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600.5(d) (West Supp. 1990).
30. See id. § 4600(d); 2 C. MARKEY, CALIFORNIA FAMILY LAW PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 22.81, at 22-63 (1978).
31. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(d); 2 C. MARKEY, supra note 30, § 22.81, at 22-63.
32. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600.5(d)(2), (4); Bruch, And How Are the Children? The Ef-
fects of Ideology and Mediation on Child Custody Law and Children's Well-Being in the United
States, 2 INT'L J.L. & FAM. 106, 108 (1988). The Birnbaum case involves a joint custody
arrangement, so the author does not focus on sole custody, other than to provide these general
definitions.
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tation."33 In sole legal custody arrangements, the court grants one par-
ent "the right and the responsibility to make the decisions relating to the
health, education, and welfare of a child."34
The underlying policy furthered by these statutes is to assure a mi-
nor child frequent and continuing contact with both parents.3" In evalu-
ating a parent's general suitability as a sole custodian, courts consider
"which parent is more likely to allow the child... frequent and continu-
ing contact with the noncustodial parent."36 Generally, the more coop-
erative parent is granted sole custody because this parent presumably will
allow greater contact with the noncustodial parent, satisfying the stat-
ute's underlying policy.37
b. joint custody
As an alternative to sole custody, the California legislature has also
provided for "joint custody."3 Joint custody is defined as "joint physical
custody and joint legal custody."39 This definition, however, is inade-
quate because the statute neither defines the roles of each parent nor the
nature of the living arrangements for the child. Consequently, courts
must provide their own interpretations. One interpretation derived from
a combination of legal sources is that: (1) joint custody allows both par-
ents an equal voice in their child's upbringing, reaching decisions as they
probably would have, had the marriage remained intact; (2) joint custody
apparently does not give either parent a greater right than he or she had
before the marriage ended; and (3) the parents share equal rights, respon-
33. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600.5(d)(2).
34. Id. § 4600.5(d)(4).
35. Id. § 4600(a); see Kloster, The New Joint Custody Statute: Chrysalis of Conflict or
Conciliation?, 21 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 471, 481 (1981).
36. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(b). A major factor in reducing the immediate disturbing
effects on children is the continuation of their relationships with both parents. McLoren, 202
Cal. App. 3d at 114, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 900 (court erroneously modified custody to joint custody
where parents had ongoing inability to cooperate in their parenting responsibilities due to se-
vere hostility toward each other, at times erupting into physical violence, and to virtual ab-
sence of any communication between them); cf Murga v. Petersen (In re Marriage of Murga),
103 Cal. App. 3d 498, 503, 163 Cal. Rptr. 79, 80 (1980) (one parent's establishing residency in
far away place to preclude other's visitation constitutes change in circumstances to modify
visitation order); Richards, Joint Custody Revisited, 19 FAM. L. 83, 83 (1989).
37. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600.5(b).
38. Id. § 4600.5(c).
39. Id. § 4600.5(d)(1). Joint custody has two components, joint legal custody and joint
physical custody. 2 C. MARKEY, supra note 30, § 22.81, at 22-63; see Atkinson, Criteria for
Deciding Child Custody in the Trial and Appellate Courts, 18 FAM. L.Q. 1, 36 (1984). In 1983
joint custody was defined as "an order awarding custody of the minor child or children to both
parents." CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600.5(c) (West 1983) (current version at CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 4600.5(d)(1) (West Supp. 1990)).
[Vol. 24:467
January 1991] MODIFYING CHILD CUSTODY ARRANGEMENTS 473
sibilities and decision-making with respect to the child for the child's
care, control, education, health and religion." Under this interpretation,
joint custody assumes significant involvement by both parents in the
child's physical care and in making major decisions affecting the child.41
Both parents have equal rights and responsibilities for their child and,
therefore, an equal voice in decisions affecting their child's long-term
welfare.42 Joint custody, however, does not necessarily provide for equal
division of time between the parents.43
(1) joint legal custody
Under joint legal custody, parents share both the right and the re-
sponsibility to make the decisions relating to the health, education and
welfare of the child.' The child's living arrangements may seem exactly
like sole custody with visitation rights.45 A court, however, may award
joint legal custody without joint physical custody.46 If a court awards
parents both joint physical custody and joint legal custody, the distinc-
tion between these two types of custody awards may not seem appar-
ent.47 One important difference, however, is that joint legal custody does
not involve the child's residence.4" Joint legal custody additionally re-
quires consultation between the parents in making decisions.49 Some ex-
amples of decisions that would require consultation between the parents
with joint legal custody include whether the child should attend a private
school, participate in religious activities or obtain costly dental care.50
Decisions not requiring consultation include whether a child must com-
40. Burge, 41 Cal. 2d at 616, 262 P.2d at 11; O'Connell, 80 Cal. App. 3d at 858, 146 Cal.
Rptr. at 32; Cox & Cease, Joint Custody: What Does It Mean? How Does It Work?, 1 FAM. L.
REP. 2228, 2230 (1976); Comment, California's Presumption Favoring Joint Child Custody:
California Civil Code Sections 4600 and 4600.5, 17 CAL. W.L. REv. 286, 296 n.76, 299 (1981).
41. Bruch, supra note 32, at 108-09.
42. Comment, supra note 40, at 298.
43. Birnbaum v. Birnbaum (In re Marriage of Birnbaum), 211 Cal. App. 3d 1508, 1515,
260 Cal. Rptr. 210, 215 (1989); see, e.g., Lewin v. Lewin (In re Marriage of Lewin), 186 Cal.
App. 3d 1482, 1491, 231 Cal. Rptr. 433, 437 (1986) (court upheld joint legal and physical
custody with primary physical custody with father and visitation to mother).
44. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600.5(d)(5).
45. WOMAN'S LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, THE CUSTODY HANDBOOK: A WOMAN'S GUIDE
TO CHILD CUSTODY DISPUTES 4 (1988).
46. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600.5(g); see, e.g., Coddington, 210 Cal. App. 2d at 98-99, 26 Cal.
Rptr. at 432-33 (legal custody awarded to father and mother jointly but physical custody
awarded only to father).
47. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600.5(d)(3), (5) (only apparent difference is significant periods
of physical custody required for joint physical custody).
48. See id.; Comment, supra note 40, at 299.
49. Comment, supra note 40, at 299.
50. Id. at 296 n.75, 299-300.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
plete homework assignments or participate in after-school activities.-"
(2) joint physical custody
Joint physical custody requires that each parent has physical cus-
tody of a child for a significant period of time. 2 The goal of joint physi-
cal custody is to arrange a scheme which provides a child well-balanced
contact with both parents. 3 The parents alternate as physical custodian
of the child and, thus, share in the child's residential care14 and control. 55
There is no set pattern for joint physical custody; therefore, parents may
help choose the schedule the court ultimately adopts.5 6 A common
schedule is for the child to spend three days each week with one parent
and four days with the other.5 7 A child may also alternate the schedules
with his or her parents weekly or annually. 8 Under a joint physical cus-
tody arrangement, both parents make decisions affecting the child's well-
being on a day-to-day basis.59 Moreover, the physical custodian need not
consult with the noncustodian in making these decisions.'
(3) types of joint custody arrangements
Joint custody may exist in varying forms, such as split, divided or
shared custody.6 1 "Split custody" arises when parents share in the physi-
cal custody of their child.62 One example of "split custody" is where the
child alternates between parents' homes based on a specific schedule.
6 3
Another example arises where there is more than one child from the
51. Id. at 299.
52. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600.5(d)(3).
53. See id.
54. Comment, supra note 40, at 299; Bodenheimer, Progress Under the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act and Remaining Problems; Punitive Decrees, Joint Custody and Exces-
sive Modification, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 978, 1009 (1977) (joint legal custody of child is shared at
all times by both parents, but joint physical custody is alternated according to parents'
agreement).
55. Burge, 41 Cal. 2d at 617, 262 P.2d at 12 ("Custody" means "complete custody or all
rights involved in custody.").
56. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600.5(d); J. WALLERSTEIN & S. BLAKESLEE, SECOND
CHANCES: MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN A DECADE AFrER DIVORCE 257 (1989).
57. See J. WALLERSTEIN & S. BLAKESLEE, supra note 56, at 257.
58. Id.
59. See Lerner, 38 Cal. 2d at 681, 242 P.2d at 323 (essence of custody is companionship of
child and right to make decisions regarding care and control, education, health and religion);
O'Connell, 80 Cal. App. 3d at 858, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 32; Comment, supra note 40, at 299.
60. Comment, supra note 40, at 299.
61. Id. at 294-95; see P. WOOLLEY, THE CUSTODY HANDBOOK 195-201 (1979).
62. Comment, supra note 40, at 294.
63. Schillerman v. Schillerman, 61 Mich. App. 446, 447, 232 N.W.2d 737, 738 (1975);
Comment, supra note 40, at 294.
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marriage." In this situation, the children are separated so that some live
with their mother, while others reside with their father."
"Divided custody"6 6 refers to an arrangement where the child re-
mains in the custody of one parent during part of the year and then lives
with the other parent for the remainder of that year.17 Visitation rights
are allowed to the noncustodial parent. 8 Each parent has exclusive con-
trol over the child when the child is under the parent's custody.6 9 Usu-
ally the custodial year is divided between the school year and summer
vacation. 0 Parents and courts may choose this type of arrangement
when the parents expect to live at great distances from each other and,
consequently, split custody would be impracticable. 7
"Shared custody" is an arrangement where the child grows up inter-
acting with both parents in everyday situations.72 Under this arrange-
ment, the child is able to maintain "realistic and more normal
relationships with each parent. ' 73 In formulating a joint custody ar-
rangement, the court must specify each parent's right to physical control
of the child in sufficient detail to prevent future conflicts and eliminate
child snatching and kidnapping.74
(4) joint custody benefits and burdens
There are both advantages and disadvantages to joint custody ar-
64. Rocha v. Rocha, 123 Cal. App. 2d 28, 30, 266 P.2d 130, 131 (1954) (split custody of
infant sons); Frazier v. Frazier, 115 Cal. App. 2d 551, 559, 252 P.2d 693, 698 (1953) (custody
of daughter age two awarded to father and son age eight awarded to mother); McAuliffe v.
McAuliffe, 53 Cal. App. 352, 355, 199 P. 1071, 1072-73 (1921) (custody of youngest children
awarded to mother and custody of oldest two children awarded to father); see WOMEN'S
LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, supra note 45, at 4; Comment, supra note 40, at 294.
65. Comment, supra note 40, at 294. Judges do not usually believe that it is good for the
children to separate them from one another. WOMEN'S LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, supra note
45, at 4; see supra note 64.
66. Divided custody may also be referred to as alternating custody. J. FOLBERG, JOINT
CUSTODY AND SHARED PARENTING 6 (1984).
67. Id.; see Merrill v. Merrill, 167 Cal. App. 2d 423, 424, 334 P.2d 583, 584 (1959) (father
had custody on alternate weekends, certain holidays and six weeks in summer); Juri v. Juri, 61
Cal. App. 2d 815, 817, 143 P.2d 708, 709 (1943) (mother had custody four months, father had
custody eight months).
68. As used herein, noncustodial parent is the parent that does not have physical custody
of the child at the time in question.
69. J. FOLBERG, supra note 66, at 6.
70. Comment, supra note 40, at 294.
71. See P. WOOLLEY, supra note 61, at 103.
72. Comment, supra note 40, at 294. See P. WOOLLEY, supra note 61, at 98-108, for a
discussion of the problems associated with shared custody arrangements.
73. Comment, supra note 40, at 294-95.
74. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600.5(f).
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rangements. The main advantage is that both parents may actively par-
ticipate in their child's upbringing.75 The parents can provide day-to-day
care and make major decisions regarding their child's life.76 As a result,
the child feels secure in the love and involvement of both parents, and the
parents are satisfied by maintaining close contact with their child.77
There are, however, inherent problems with joint custody arrangements.
Joint custody may create instability in the child's life78 and place the
child in the middle of the parents' conflicts. A child may feel as if he or
she is caught in a tug-of-war between the parents, a situation which is
further aggravated by the "joint" rights of the parents.79 In addition,
joint custody may expose a child to a "psychological blow" if a parent
pulls out of such an arrangement.8" Children generally attribute the loss
of one parent's care to a rejection of themselves, not to that parent's re-
jection of the marriage.8' Thus, the success of a joint custody award
depends upon the degree to which the parents are able to cooperate with
each other.8
2
75. Atkinson, supra note 39, at 37.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.; see McLoren, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 214, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 900 (intense loyalty
conflict between parents experienced by both children throughout custody litigation).
80. J. WALLERSTEIN & J. BLAKESLEE, supra note 56, at 270.
81. Id.
82. See Birnbaum, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 1511 n.4, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 212 n.4 (parents love
their children but neither can see past their particular egocentric needs to acknowledge full
value of other parent to child); McLoren, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 114, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 900 (court
erroneously modified custody to joint custody where parents had ongoing inability to ooper-
ate in their parenting responsibilities due to severe hostility toward each other, at times erupt-
ing into physical violence, and to virtual absence of any communication between them);
Atkinson, supra note 39, at 37-38. A recent report from the Center for the Family in Transi-
tion in Matin County has found no evidence that joint custody promoted the children's adjust-
ment to their parents' divorce. Joint Custody Findings Surprise Few, 12 Cal. Fan. L. Rep.
(Adams & Sevitch) No. 5, at 3630, 3630 (May 1988) [hereinafter Joint Custody Findings]. The
center conducted two separate studies; the first considered families that chose their own cus-
tody arrangements; the second considered families with extensive post-dissolution conflict. Id.
The findings were as follows:
The first study found that there was no significant relationship between 'access
arrangements' and the child's adjustment to the divorce; of greater importance were
the child's age, the presence or absence of parental depression and anxiety, and the
degree of physical and verbal aggression between the parents. The second study
found that, where divorce disputes were severe, children who had greater access to
both parents . . . were more emotionally troubled and behaviorally disturbed.
Greater exposure to conflict between their parents made them more vulnerable to
being caught up and used in the disputes. The researcher cautioned against encour-
aging or mandating joint custody when parents are involved in an ongoing struggle.
Id. Dr. Judith Wallerstein, Executive Director of the Center, said that in order to maintain
continuous contact with both parents the child does not have to go back and forth between
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B. Initial Determination of Child Custody
Courts focus their initial custody determination upon what custody
arrangement would be best for the child.s 3 Courts make this determina-
tion according to the "best interests" standard defined in section 4608 of
the California Civil Code." Section 4608 delineates broad considerations
upon which courts must base their decisions."5 Because this standard is
extremely vague and difficult to apply, courtshave developed a list of
factors 6 that they consider important in making the initial custody
determination.
1. The "best interests" standard
Many factors are involved in a court's initial determination of child
custody arrangements.87 The courts, however, have formulated most of
these factors because the California Civil Code sections dealing with ini-
tial custody determinations are extremely vague.8 8 Section 4600 of the
California Civil Code states merely that "[c]ustody should be awarded
... according to the best interests of the child." 9 It is not clear what
"best interests" means.90 Section 4608, however, requires courts specifi-
cally to consider: (1) the health, safety and welfare of the child; (2) any
homes. Id. She also said that "[w]hile joint custody may still be warranted in some cases,
these studies certainly don't show it to be the boon for kids that everyone hoped it would be."
Id.
83. See infra notes 87-140 and accompanying text.
84. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4608 (West Supp. 1990).
85. See infra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
86. See infra notes 102-40 and accompanying text.
87. See infra notes 102-40 and accompanying text. In Foster v. Foster, the court stated:
In deciding a matter so vital to the parents and to the welfare of the child, it is
important that the trial court in order to make as wise a decision as possible, should
have as complete a picture of the whole background of the child as possible,-the
financial condition of the parents, their interests, their morals, and their dispositions,
as well as any other factor which might aid the court in determining the probabilities
of either parent furnishing a happy, harmonious home for the child.
8 Cal. 2d 719, 732, 68 P.2d 719, 725 (1937), quoted in Hue v. Pickford, 96 Cal. App. 2d 766,
770-71, 216 P.2d 128, 131 (1950)."
88. See Birnbaum v. Birnbaum (In re Marriage of Birnbaum), 211 Cal. App. 3d 1508,
1515, 260 Cal. Rptr. 210, 214 (1988); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4600, 4600.5, 4608 (West Supp.
1990); Charlow, Awarding Custody: The Best Interests of the Child and Other Fictions, 5 YALE
L. & PoL'Y REv. 267, 269 (1987).
89. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(b) (emphasis added).
90. This standard might be interpreted as either a happy childhood or one that leads to a
child's becoming a well-adjusted adult, regardless of a happy childhood experience. For a
discussion of children's best interests and the wide discretion available to judges in making
their custody decisions, see P. WOOLLEY, supra note 61, at 261. For a detailed discussion of
the problem of defining the best interests of the child, see Chambers, Rethinking Substantive
Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REv. 477, 487-99 (1984).
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history of abuse by one or both parents against the child; and (3) the
nature and amount of contact with each tarent.91 In addition to these
specified factors, section 4608 instructs the courts to consider any "other
factors [they] find[ ] relevant." 92 As a result of this vague statutory lan-
guage, courts have applied a series of independent components in making
the initial custody determination. These factors include: mental instabil-
ity, alcohol and drug problems, frequent changes of residence, relation-
ships with stepparents and stepsiblings, abuse and neglect, time with
parent pending trial or during appeal, heterosexual or homosexual rela-
tionships, children's preferences, care and religion.93 When applying the
statutory and common-law considerations, however, the courts' overrid-
ing consideration must be what is best for the child.9 4
The best interests standard emerged because the adverse nature of
91. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4608.
92. Id. Although judges attempt to remain objective in their decisions, they are often
affected by their own backgrounds and biases. Dupaix, supra note 17, at 652-53; Pearson &
Ring, Judicial Decision-Making in Contested Custody Cases, 21 J. FAM. L. 703, 724 (1983);
Wexler, Rethinking the Modification of Child Custody Decrees, 94 YALE L.J. 757, 762 (1985).
The subjective nature of the best interests standard allows judges to use their discretion to
consider the individual qualities of each parent and to make determinations based upon their
own personality, temperament, background, interests and biases. Dupaix, supra note 17, at
652; Wexler, supra, at 762. The judges' own psychological observations of the parents may
also permeate their decisions. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & S. SOLNIT, IN THE BEST INTER-
ESTS OF THE CHILD 27 (1985). As such, judges may adopt the roles of psychologists with
expertise in child development. Id. Consequently, the process of determining child custody
may be "less than a product of reasoned application of precedent" than of judges' personal
beliefs. Id.
93. The nature of the elements the courts take into account depend upon the facts of a
particular case. See, e-g., Carney v. Carney (In re Marriage of Carney), 24 Cal. 3d 725, 598
P.2d 36, 157 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1979) (health or disabilities of parent); Lewin v. Lewin (In re
Marriage of Lewin), 186 Cal. App. 3d 1482, 231 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1986) (fitness of parent);
Levin v. Levin (In re Marriage of Levin), 102 Cal. App. 3d 981, 162 Cal. Rptr. 757 (1980)
(health or disabilities of parent); Urband v. Urband (In re Marriage of Urband), 68 Cal. App.
3d 796, 137 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1977) (mother's Jehovah's Witness religion not basis for award to
father because religion not detrimental for prohibiting blood transfusion when none needed);
Nadler v. Superior Court, 255 Cal. App. 2d 523, 63 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1967) (homosexual par-
ent); Immerman v. Immerman, 176 Cal. App. 2d 122, 1 Cal. Rptr. 298 (1959) (lesbian or gay
parent); Colombo v. Colombo, 71 Cal. App. 2d 577, 582-84, 162 P.2d 995 (1945) (mother's
mental condition was one determining factor in award of custody to father); see Atkinson,
supra note 39, at 8-10. All or some of these factors may be relevant in the initial custody
determination depending upon the facts of the case being considered. These are just some of
the factors that courts consider when making a child custody determination. The above fac-
tors were irrelevant in the Birnbaum case, and, as a result, are not addressed in this Note.
94. Burchard v. Garay, 42 Cal. 3d 531, 536, 724 P.2d 486, 489, 229 Cal. Rptr. 800, 803
(1986); Kim v. Kim, 208 Cal. App. 3d 364, 370, 256 Cal. Rptr. 217, 220 (1989); Brockman v.
Brockman (In re Marriage of Brockman), 194 Cal. App. 3d 1035, 1041, 240 Cal. Rptr. 96, 98
(1987); Sam E. v. Stahl (Guardianship of Claralyn S.), 148 Cal. App. 3d 81, 85, 195 Cal. Rptr.
646, 649 (1983).
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divorce proceedings made it easy for courts and parents to ignore the
rights and interests of the child.95 Therefore, this standard dictates that
judges ignore individual parental wishes and instead arrange a custody
agreement that best furthers the child's welfare.96 Moreover, the focus of
custody proceedings is on the child's needs, not on parental rights, mis-
givings or desires.9 7 Such proceedings are neither meant to discipline one
parent for individual shortcomings, nor reward the unoffending parent.98
In some cases, children may be represented by counsel in custody
proceedings. 99 Either a parent or the child, if sufficiently mature to voice
a desire to be represented, may apply for counsel for the child.1°" In
addition, the court upon its own motion may appoint the child an in-
dependent counsel.101
2. Factors courts use in applying the "best interests" standard
a. primary caretaker
Judges may have some preference in awarding custody to the pri-
mary caretaker.10 2 One commentator states that judges may assume that
the primary caretaker has a closer relationship with the child and is more
experienced in meeting the child's needs, particularly when the child is
95. Dupaix, supra note 17, at 652.
96. Id.
97. Kern v. Kern (In re Marriage of Kern), 87 Cal. App. 3d 402, 410, 150 Cal. Rptr. 860,
865 (1979); Charlow, supra note 88, at 268.
98. See Stoker v. Kinney (In re Marriage of Stoker), 65 Cal. App. 3d 878, 881-82, 135 Cal.
Rptr. 616, 618 (1977); Clarke v. Clarke, 4 Cal. App. 3d 583, 589, 84 Cal. Rptr. 393, 395-96
(1970); Stack v. Stack, 189 Cal. App. 2d 357, 371, 11 Cal. Rptr. 177, 187 (1961); Ashwell v.
Ashwell, 135 Cal. App. 2d 211, 217, 286 P.2d 983, 987 (1955); Sorrels v. Sorrels, 105 Cal.
App. 2d 465, 471, 234 P.2d 103, 106 (1951).
99. Section 4606(a) of the California Civil Code states, "In any initial or subsequent pro-
ceeding under this part where there is in issue the custody of or visitation with a minor child,
the court may, if it determines it would be in the best interests of the minor child, appoint
private counsel to represent the interests of the minor child." CAL. CIV. CODE § 4606(a)
(West Supp. 1990); accord In re Marriage of Schwander, 79 Cal. App. 3d 1013, 1021, 145 Cal.
Rptr. 325, 330 (1978). See generally Ardagh, California Civil Code Section 4606: Separate
Representation for Children in Dissolution Custody Proceedings, 14 U.S.F. L. Rnv. 571 (1980)
(discusses children's independent representation, circumstances that prompt courts to appoint
independent counsel for children and role of appointed attorney).
100. See In re Patricia E., 174 Cal. App. 3d 1, 7, 219 Cal. Rptr. 783, 786 (1985); S. ADAMS
& N. SEVITCH, CALIFORNIA FAMILY LAW PRACTICE §§ L.124-125.1, at L-32 to -33 (1988)
(explanation of how to apply for representation).
101. Patricia E., 174 Cal. App. 3d at 7, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 786; see S. ADAMS & N. SEvrrcH,
supra note 100, §§ L.124-125.1, at L-32 to -33.
102. See, e.g., Burchard, 42 Cal. 3d at 541, 724 P.2d at 492, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 807; see
Atkinson, supra note 39, at 18-19. As used herein the primary caretaker is the parent who
predominantly cares for the child.
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young." 3 This parent has already demonstrated commitment to the
child by caring for him or her and will most likely continue this care."
Courts, however, may encounter problems in determining which
parent is the primary caretaker, especially in cases where both parents
have been almost equally involved in raising and caring for their child. 05
As a child grows older and becomes more independent, the role of the
primary caretaker lessens and this factor may be less important to courts
considering which parent should be awarded custody.
l0 6
b. time available to spend with the child
In addition to considering the role of the child's primary caretaker,
courts must consider the amount of time each parent has available to
spend with the child.'0 7 If one parent has more time to care for the child,
one commentator suggests that courts may tend to consider this heav-
ily.'OS It is certainly in the child's best interests to have a parent present
to help him or her develop into an adult.'0 9 The California legislature
also deemed the amount of contact with parents as an important factor in
child custody determinations." 0
c. stability of environment and educational opportunity
Another important factor courts weigh in determining the child's
best interests is the stability in the child's established home environ-
ment."' Courts are concerned with whether the child is cared for and
well adjusted to his or her existing environment." 2 Accordingly, courts
may be reluctant to change the child's living arrangement."13 If the child
103. See Atkinson, supra note 39, at 16-17.
104. Id. at 17.
105. Id. at 18.
106. Id.
107. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 4608(c).
108. See Atkinson, supra note 39, at 19.
109. See BEYOND THE BEST INTEREsTs, supra note 19, at 4.
110. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 4608(c).
111. Burchard, 42 Cal. 3d at 535, 724 P.2d at 488, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 802 (court interested in
preserving stable custody arrangements); Carney, 24 Cal. 3d at 730, 598 P.2d at 38, 157 Cal.
Rptr. at 385 (policy of not upsetting child's established living situation); Mehlmauer v,
Mehlmauer (In re Marriage of Mehlmauer), 60 Cal. App. 3d 104, 109, 131 Cal. Rptr. 325, 329
(1976) (child lived with mother for 8 years and court found that "[w]here all things appear
essentially equal, it would seem beneficial to leave child in accustomed environment").
112. See, eg., Burchard, 42 Cal. 3d at 535, 724 P.2d at 488, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 802; Carney,
24 Cal. 3d at 730, 598 P.2d at 38, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
113. See, eg., Burchard, 42 Cal. 3d at 535, 724 P.2d at 488, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 802 (underly-
ing policy of stability); McLoren v. McLoren (In re Marriage of McLoren), 202 Cal. App. 3d
108, 113, 247 Cal. Rptr. 897, 900 (1988) (court should give full regard to maintenance of stable
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has a stable and secure relationship with one parent, courts usually
award custody to that parent.1 14 Further, courts may give great weight
to the child's educational opportunities.1 5 Therefore, the parent who
can better help the child with academic performance or special learning
problems will often obtain custody. 6
d. mental capacity, health or disability
Courts may also consider a parent's mental or physical condition in
custody proceedings, but these factors usually do not justify an award to
the healthier parent. 1 7 It is important to note that courts are "not re-
quired to find that one parent is unfit... as a prerequisite to awarding
custody to the other parent." '18 The personal behavior and the charac-
teristics of the parent, however, are relevant to the court's decision in
determining whether a child should be left in that parent's custody.119
homelife and disturbing effect which may result from change in child's established environ-
ment); Levin, 102 Cal. App. 3d at 988, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 761 (child's custody was not changed
because stability and security in child's development were essential for child's happiness and
proper development). See generally BEYOND THE BST INTERESTS, supra note 19 (impor-
tance of stable environment for children).
114. Levin, 102 Cal. App. 3d at 988, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 761 (child's custody was not changed
because stability and security in child's development were essential for child's happiness and
proper development); Mehlmauer, 60 Cal. App. 3d at 109, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 329 (child lived
with mother for eight years and court found that "[w]here all things appear essentially equal, it
would seem beneficial to leave child in accustomed environment").
115. See, e.g., Birnbaum, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 1514, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 213 (joint custody
arrangement changed to make father "school parent" because school system in which former
husband resided was superior to that in which wife resided); In re Marriage of Rosson, 178
Cal. App. 3d 1094, 1102, 224 Cal. Rptr. 250, 256 (1986) (children's primary physical residence
was with mother, but modified when she moved based on need for stable environment and
father's testimony about his involvement with children's academic, athletic, social and reli-
gious activities). See infra note 261 for examples where changing schools is not in the chil-
dren's best interests.
116. Atkinson, supra note 39, at 22.
117. See, e.g., Burchard, 42 Cal. 3d 531, 724 P.2d 486, 229 Cal. Rptr. 800 (mother's past
emotional problems were insignificant); Carney, 24 Cal. 3d 725, 598 P.2d 36, 157 Cal. Rptr.
383 (father's physical handicap, which affected his ability to participate in physical activities
with his child, did not constitute changed circumstance significant enough to justify taking
child out of his custody); Frazier v. Frazier, 115 Cal. App. 2d 551, 559, 252 P.2d 693, 698
(1953) (custody of daughter age two awarded to father because daughter's birth brought
mother's mental condition to focus and son age eight awarded to mother); Columbo, 71 Cal.
App. 2d at 582, 162 P.2d at 997-98 (error to award mother custody because she suffered from
recurring insanity).
118. Cunningham v. Cunningham, 217 Cal. App. 2d 65, 67, 31 Cal. Rptr. 448, 449 (1963);
accord Stack, 189 Cal. App. 2d at 371, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 187.
119. Stack, 189 Cal. App. 2d at 371, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
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e. interference with visitation
Courts further regard access to visitation as a substantial component
in custody decisions.1 20 This is probably because courts feel that children
need both parents to participate in their upbringing. 2 Although their
parents are no longer married, children need reassurance that both par-
ents still accept and want them. 22 Section 4600(b)(1) of the California
Civil Code provides that courts should determine custody according to
which parent will allow for frequent and continuing contact with the
other parent.1 23 Courts attempt to preserve visitation rights whenever
possible. 24 Courts, however, will probably alter custody arrangements
where the custodial parent interferes with visitation. 125 A commentator
has stated that courts alter custody under these circumstances because:
(1) a child has easier access to the security and love of both parents, 126
and (2) the parent who is granted access is usually more emotionally
stable and a better role model for the child.'27
120. Section 4601 of the California Civil Code states that:
In making an order pursuant to Section 4600.5, the court shall order reasonable visi-
tation rights to a parent unless it is shown that the visitation would be detrimental to
the best interests of the child. In the discretion of the court, reasonable visitation
rights may be granted to any other person having an interest in the welfare of the
child.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 4601 (West Supp. 1990). See O'Connell v. O'Connell (In re Marriage of
O'Connell), 80 Cal. App. 3d 849, 146 Cal. Rptr. 26 (1978) for a general discussion of the
differences between custody and visitation.
121. Richards, supra note 36, at 83. A major factor in reducing the immediate disturbing
effects on children is the continuation of their relationships with both parents. Id.
122. Atkinson, supra note 39, at 26.
123. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(b)(1).
124. See, e.g., Birdsall v. Birdsall (In re Marriage of Birdsall), 197 Cal. App. 3d 1024, 1030-
31, 243 Cal. Rptr. 287, 290 (1988) (no restraining order on overnight visitation with homosex-
ual parent); Murga v. Petersen (In re Marriage of Murga), 103 Cal. App. 3d 498, 503, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 79, 80 (1980) (one parent's establishing residency in far away place to preclude other's
visitation constitutes change in circumstances to modify visitation order). The paramount
consideration in child custody and visitation is the welfare of the children. Sanchez v.
Sanchez, 55 Cal. 2d 118, 121, 358 P.2d 533, 535, 10 Cal. Rptr. 261, 263 (1961); Matthews v.
Matthews (In re Marriage of Matthews), 101 Cal. App. 3d 811, 818, 161 Cal. Rptr. 879, 883
(1980); Devine v. Devine, 213 Cal. App. 2d 549, 552, 29 Cal. Rptr. 132, 134 (1963).
125. See Speelman v. Superior Court, 152 Cal. App. 3d 124, 132, 199 Cal. Rptr. 784, 789
(1983) (one parent's frustrating other's efforts to see child could justify changed circum-
stances); Murga, 103 Cal. App. 3d at 503, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 80 (one parent's establishing
residency in distant place to preclude other's visitation constitutes change in circumstances to
modify visitation order); Atkinson, supra note 39, at 26.
126. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(a) (legislature states that public policy of state is to assure
child frequent and continuing contact with both parents); Atkinson, supra note 39, at 26.
127. Atkinson, supra note 39, at 26.
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f the child's preferences
In addition to other factors, courts may consider the child's prefer-
ences in establishing any custody arrangement. Section 4600 provides
that "[i]f a child is of sufficient age and capacity to reason so as to form
an intelligent preference as to custody, the court shall consider and give
due weight to the wishes of the child in making an award of custody or
modification." '128 The language of this statute is not mandatory, but dis-
cretionary. 129 In some cases, courts may consider it unwise to consider
the child's preference because such a course of action "may destroy what
little good will is left between the parents or between one of the parents
and the child."130 Nonetheless, there clearly is a legislative preference to
interview minors to determine their best interests.
13 1
Wallerstein and Kelly, well-known researchers who studied the im-
pact of divorce on children, made numerous observations about the age
when children's preferences should be followed.1 32  They found that
"children below adolescence [were] not reliable judges of their own best
interests and that their attitudes at the time of the divorce crisis may be
very much at odds with their usual feelings and inclinations." 133
Preadolescent children may not be able to make informed judgments
about their own interests because of their long-lasting anger at the parent
whom they held responsible for the divorce. 134 Children of this age are
also subject to being "co-opted into the parental battling ... tak[ing]
sides, often against a parent to whom they had been tenderly attached
during the intact marriage; and... attempt[ing] to rescue a distressed
parent often to their own detriment." 13 These observations, along with
findings that children with the "most passionate convictions at the time
of the breakup later ... regret[ted] their vehement statements at that
128. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4600(a) (emphasis added).
129. Mehlmauer, 60 Cal. App. 3d at 110, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 329; Messer v. Messer, 259 Cal.
App. 2d 507, 509, 66 Cal. Rptr. 417, 418 (1968); Stack, 189 Cal. App. 2d at 364, 11 Cal. Rptr.
at 183. Thus, it is not a ground for later reversal if the court refuses to consider the desires of
the child. Mehlmauer, 60 Cal. App. 3d at 110-11, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 329; Messer, 259 Cal.
App. 2d at 509, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 418; Stack, 189 Cal. App. 2d at 364, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 183
(child was ten and court did not consider her preference).
130. Stack, 189 Cal. App. 2d at 364, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 183.
131. See Detrich v. Dorothy H. (In re Jack H.), 106 Cal. App. 3d 257, 269, 165 Cal. Rptr.
646, 653-54 (1980) (court should use trial judge's inquiry of children's preferences at ages 8
and 11 instead of presuming what children preferred); CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(a).
132. J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 19, at 314 (study of 60 families over time to
assess impact of divorce on their development).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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time, have increased [the] misgivings about relying on the expressed
opinions and preferences of youngsters below adolescence in deciding the
issues which arise in divorce-related litigation."
' 13 6
Another recent study by researchers determined that judges of the
Superior Court of California, when making their custody decisions, at-
tached greater significance to children's preferences as the children's age
increased.137 The preferences of adolescent children had a much
stronger influence on judges than the desires of latency age children, and
the desires of the very young had even less of an influence. 1 38 Although
courts generally consider the child's preference, the weight of this factor
depends, in part, on the child's psychological makeup, level of matur-
ity139 and age.140
C. Standards for Modification
1. Statutory guidelines
After the court makes its initial custody determination, parents may
still be able to change this arrangement through modification proceed-
ings. Section 4600 of the California Civil Code 41 provides that "[iln any
proceeding where there is at issue the custody of a minor child, the court
may, during the pendency of the proceeding or at any time thereafter,
make such order for the custody of the child during minority as may
seem necessary or proper."142 The phrase "at any time thereafter" au-
thorizes the court to modify its original custody award. 143
In addition, section 4600.5 of the California Civil Code 44 specifi-
136. Id. at 314-15.
137. Reidy, Siver & Carlson, Child Custody Decisions: A Survey of Judges, 23 FAM. L.Q.
75, 78 (1989) (study done by questionnaire of 156 California Superior Court judges in 41 of 58
counties covering aspects of child custody dispute resolution process).
138. Id.
139. "Maturity is not measured by chronological age." Rosson v. Rosson (In re Marriage
of Rosson), 178 Cal. App. 3d 1094, 1103, 224 Cal. Rptr. 250, 256 (1986) (maturity is factor
used to determine at what age child's preference should be considered in custody case).
140. CAL. R. Cr. 1285.10.
141. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600 (West Supp. 1990).
142. Id. § 4600(a) (emphasis added).
143. 2 C. MARKEY, supra note 30, § 22.90, at 22-66.
144. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600.5 (West Supp. 1990). Section 4600.5(i) provides that:
Any order for joint custody may be modified or terminated upon the petition of one
or both parents or on the court's own motion if it is shown that the best interests of
the child require modification or termination of the order. The court shall state in its
decision the reasons for modification or termination of the joint custody order if
either parent opposes the modification or termination order.
Id. § 4600.5(i).
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cally applies to the modification of joint custody agreements. 145 The stat-
ute states that any order for joint custody may be modified upon petition
of one or both parents or upon the court's own motion if it is shown that
the child's best interests require modification of the order.141 The party
seeking the modification has the burden of proving that such a modifica-
tion is in the best interests of the child.'47 If the court decides to modify
the initial custody agreement, the court must state its reasons if either
parent opposes the modification. 14  In making its decision, the court
"should give full regard to 'the maintenance of a stable homelife, and the
disturbing effect which might result from a change of the child's estab-
lished mode of living.' "149 These concerns apply whether the court is
contemplating a change in physical or legal custody."' Generally, the
decision to modify custody is based on the circumstances at the time of
the modification. 15 ' The court, however, may also consider prior con-
duct to determine whether to modify the custody arrangement.
152
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Carney v. Carney (In re Marriage of Carney), 24 Cal. 3d 725, 731, 598 P.2d 36, 38,
157 Cal. Rptr. 383, 385 (1979); Kern v. Kern (In re Marriage of Kern), 87 Cal. App. 3d 402,
410-11, 150 Cal. Rptr. 860, 863 (1978); Mehlmauer v. Mehimauer (In re Marriage of
Mehlmauer), 60 Cal. App. 3d 104, 108-09, 131 Cal. Rptr. 325, 328 (1976).
148. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600.5(i).
149. McLoren v. McLoren (In re Marriage of McLoren), 202 Cal. App. 3d 108, 113, 247
Cal. Rptr. 897, 900 (1988) (quoting Lawrence v. Lawrence, 165 Cal. App. 2d 789, 792-93, 332
P.2d 305, 308 (1958)).
150. McLoren, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 116, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 900; see 2 C. MARKEY, supra
note 30, § 22.90, at 22-66.
151. McLoren, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 114, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 900; see also Carney, 24 Cal. 3d
at 741, 598 P.2d at 45, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 392 (court recognized during pendency of appeal
additional circumstances bearing on best interests of children may have developed and could
be considered by trial court on remand); Rosson v. Rosson (In re Marriage of Rosson), 178
Cal. App. 3d 1094, 1102, 224 Cal. Rptr. 250, 256 (1986) (court does not require "harm" to
child as prerequisite to modification of custody); Speelman v. Superior Court, 152 Cal. App. 3d
124, 132, 199 Cal. Rptr. 784, 788 & n.1 (1983) (court must articulate how circumstances have
changed since initial decision). But see Russo v. Russo, 21 Cal. App. 3d 72, 94, 98 Cal. Rptr.
501, 517 (1971) (in determining to whom child custody should be entrusted according to
child's best interests, courts must consider circumstances that gave rise to these proceedings
and circumstances which developed in interim); Denham v. Matina, 214 Cal. App. 2d 312,
320-21, 29 Cal. Rptr. 377, 383 (1963) (order reversed because trial judge did not hear evidence
of past conduct to determine fitness of parent).
152. Sanchez v. Sanchez, 55 Cal. 2d 118, 124, 358 P.2d 533, 537, 10 Cal. Rptr. 261, 265
(1961).
Although "[tihe question as to whether a parent is a fit or proper person to have the
custody of a minor child refers... to his or her fitness at the time of the hearing and
is not necessarily controlled by conduct.., prior thereto," such prior conduct may, of
course, be considered by the court in determining with which parent the best interests of
the child will be found.
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Prouty v. Prouty, 16 Cal. 2d 190, 194, 105 P.2d 295, 297
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2. Change in circumstances requirement
For courts to modify custody orders, the party seeking modification
not only must prove that such a change in custody is in the best interests
of the child, but must also show that there has been a change in circum-
stances.15 The change in circumstances requirement applies equally to
modifying physical or legal custody. 54 The burden of showing a suffi-
cient change in circumstances lies with the party seeking the change in
the custody order. 55 To justify a change in custody, there must be a
persuasive showing of substantially changed circumstances affecting the
child. 5 6 "[A] child will not be removed from the prior custody of one
parent and given to the other 'unless the material facts and circumstances
(1940)); accord Merrill v. Merrill, 167 Cal. App. 2d 423, 428, 334 P.2d 583, 587 (1959) (evi-
dence of acts prior to rendition of challenged decree inadmissible because such evidence could
not possibly show change in conditions, except where evidence of acts unknown to court or
complaining party at time challenge decree entered may be admissible).
153. Carney, 24 Cal. 3d at 730, 598 P.2d at 38, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 385; Goto v. Goto, 52 Cal.
2d 118, 122-23, 338 P.2d 450, 453 (1959); Rosson, 178 Cal. App. 3d at 1101, 224 Cal. Rptr. at
255; Speelman, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 129, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 786. Section 4600.5(d) implicitly
adopts the change in circumstances requirement by requiring a court to state its reasons for
modifying joint custody if the motion is opposed. Speelman, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 132, 199 Cal.
Rptr. at 788; CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600.5(i). The provision requiring the trial court to provide
reasons for a change in custody forces the court to articulate how circumstances have changed
since the initial decision. Speelman, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 132, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 788.
154. McLoren, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 111, 116, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 898, 901-02; see 2 C. MAR-
KEY, supra note 30, § 22.90, at 22-66. The change in circumstances requirement does not
apply in cases where the custody arrangement was not established by a court order or is a
temporary custody arrangement implemented under pendente lite stipulation, order to show
cause, or pretrial order. 2 C. MARKEY, supra note 30, § 22.90, at 22-65. "The court recog-
nized how custody was originally determined is immaterial [, that is, wlhether by stipulation
or by explicit or implied agreement, if the parties intended it to be afinal agreement, a change
of circumstance showing is required." Lewin v. Lewin (In re Marriage of Lewin), 186 Cal.
App. 3d 1482, 1486, 231 Cal. Rptr. 433, 434 (1986). The rule "requires that one identify a
prior custody decision based upon circumstances then existing which rendered that decision in
the best interest of the child. The court can then inquire whether alleged new circumstances
represent a significant change from preexisting circumstances, requiring a reevaluation of the
child's custody." Burchard v. Garay, 42 Cal. 3d 531, 534, 724 P.2d 486, 488, 229 Cal. Rptr.
800, 802 (1986); see also Lewin, 186 Cal. App. 3d at 1486-88, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 434-36 (expla-
nation of change in circumstances requirement discussing precedent). The rule is not inflexible
and is subject to exceptions where the welfare of the child requires it. Walker v. Bourland (In
re Walker), 228 Cal. App. 2d 217, 222, 39 Cal. Rptr. 243, 246 (1964). Changed circumstances
is "'another form of evidence which the court may consider in the exercise of its discretion to
hear and decide the question of modification of custody orders previously made.'" Id. at 223-
24, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 246 (quoting Kelly v. Kelly, 75 Cal. App. 2d 408, 415, 171 P.2d 95, 99
(1946)). Usually a change of circumstances must be shown, but that requirement is not an
absolute ironclad rule. Immerman v. Immerman, 176 Cal. App. 2d 122, 126, 1 Cal. Rptr. 298,
300 (1959).
155. Kern, 87 Cal. App. 3d at 410-11, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 865; Mehlmauer, 60 Cal. App. 3d at
108-09, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
156. Carney, 24 Cal. 3d at 730, 598 P.2d at 38, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 385; Goto, 52 Cal. 2d at
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occurring subsequently are of a kind to render it essential or expedient
for the welfare of the child that there be a change.' ""7 For example,
frustration of the other parent's visitation with the child may constitute a
change in circumstances.
1 5 8
The reason for this rule has been well established.' 59 The courts are
reluctant to order a change of custody and will not do so except for im-
perative reasons because it is desirable to end child custody litigation and
avoid changing the child's "established mode of living."'" Courts, how-
ever, should not be too reluctant to consider changes in circumstances
because if the change in circumstances rule is applied too mechanically,
it locks the child into a bad situation. 6' Consequently, the child may be
forced to live with a parent who either does not meet the child's needs, or
is unfit.
3. Factors courts consider in modifying custody orders
All of the factors for the initial custody determination are also rele-
vant in the modification proceedings.' 62 For example, when courts con-
sider the child's preference as to custody, that preference is entitled to
greater consideration in a modification proceeding than in the initial cus-
tody order. 63 The reason for this higher degree of consideration is that
the child has already experienced one living arrangement and, therefore,
has a more informed basis for his or her preference. 1' In the original
122-23, 338 P.2d at 453; Rosson, 178 Cal. App. 3d at 1101, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 255; Speelman,
152 Cal. App. 3d at 129, 132, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 786, 789.
157. Carney, 24 Cal. 3d at 730, 598 P.2d at 38, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 385 (quoting Washburn v.
Washburn, 49 Cal. App. 2d 581, 588, 122 P.2d 96, 100 (1942)).
158. Speelman, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 129, 132, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 786, 789.
159. See Carney, 24 Cal. 3d at 730, 598 P.2d at 38, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
160. Id. at 730-31, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 385, 598 P.2d at 38.
161. Burchard, 42 Cal. 3d at 550, 724 P.2d at 499, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 813 (Mosk, J.,
concurring).
162. Sanchez, 55 Cal. 2d at 124, 10 Cal. Rptr. at 265, 358 P.2d at 537 (1961). The most
important test is whether the modification should be in the best interest of the child. Essen-
tially, however, the change in circumstances requirement produces the same result as the best
interest test. Burchard, 42 Cal. 3d at 538-39, 724 P.2d at 490-91, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 804-05. See
supra notes 153-61 and accompanying text for a discussion of the change in circumstances
requirement.
163. See Rosson, 178 Cal. App. 3d at 1103, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 257.
A child's preference must be given serious consideration by the court in acting upon
a motion for modification of custody where: (1) the issue is whether children win be
moved from the community where they have lived for most of their lives; (2) an
excellent parent who remains in that community wishes to have the children reside
with him or her, and (3) the children, for valid reasons, have expressed a preference
to remain in the community.
Id. at 1102-03, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 256.
164. Id. at 1103, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 257.
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decree, on the other hand, the child could not predict whether a future
arrangement would work out.16
4. Standards of trial and appellate review
The high standards courts apply at the trial and appellate levels
make modification of child custody orders more difficult. 166 Assume that
there is an appeal from the trial court's modification of the initial custody
order. Appellate courts ordinarily only decide questions of law, while
the resolution of factual issues is in the sole province of the trial
courts. 167 The trial judge, "having heard the evidence, observed the wit-
nesses, their demeanor, attitude, candor or lack of candor, is best quali-
fied to pass upon and determine the factual issues presented by their
testimony." 16 This becomes especially true where the custody of a mi-
nor child is involved.169 The trial court is given great discretion to make
the initial custody order because the appellate court can only review the
trial judge's findings of fact and inferences drawn from the evidence es-
tablished at trial. 170 Even if there were conflicting evidence, the appellate
court must "indulge all intendments and reasonable inferences which
favor sustaining the trier of fact" 171 and must not disturb the finding
where substantial evidence in the record supports it. 72
The general rule is that appealed judgments and orders are pre-
sumed correct.1 73 The trial court's decision in awarding custody is not
disturbed on appeal unless there has been a clear abuse of the trial court's
165. Id.
166. See infra notes 167-78 and accompanying text.
167. Tupman v. Haberkem, 208 Cal. 256, 262-63, 280 P. 970, 973 (1929). Matters not
raised in trial courts or preserved in the record normally cannot be raised on appeal. Pulver v.
Avco Fin. Servs., 182 Cal. App. 3d 622, 632, 227 Cal. Rptr. 491, 495 (1986).
168. Nelson v. Nelson, 261 Cal. App. 2d 800, 806, 68 Cal. Rptr. 427, 431 (1968) (quoting
Currin v. Currin, 125 Cal. App. 2d 644, 651, 271 P.2d 61, 65 (1954)). Other courts also believe
that the trial judge is in the best position to rule on factual issues. See Briscoe v. Briscoe, 221
Cal. App. 2d 668, 672, 34 Cal. Rptr. 663, 666 (1963); Coil v. Coil, 211 Cal. App. 2d 411,415,
27 Cal. Rptr. 378, 381 (1962); Wood v. Wood, 207 Cal. App. 2d 33, 36, 24 Cal. Rptr. 260, 262
(1962).
169. Nelson, 261 Cal. App. 2d at 806, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 431; Coil, 211 Cal. App. 2d at 416,
27 Cal. Rptr. at 381; Currin v. Currin, 125 Cal. App. 2d 644, 651, 271 P.2d 61, 65 (1954).
170. Pulver, 182 Cal. App. 3d at 632, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 495.
171. Sanchez, 55 Cal. 2d at 126, 10 Cal. Rptr. at 266; Bookstein v. Bookstein, 7 Cal. App.
3d 219, 224, 86 Cal. Rptr. 495, 499 (1970).
172. Bookstein, 7 Cal. App. 3d at 224, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 499.
173. Denham v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 557, 564, 46 P.2d 193, 197, 86 Cal. Rptr. 65, 69
(1970) ("All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which
record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown."); Jacques Interiors v. Petrak, 188 Cal.
App. 3d 1363, 1369, 234 Cal. Rptr. 44, 47 (1987).
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discretion.174 The general test for abuse of the trial court's discretion is
"whether or not the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason, all of the
circumstances before it being considered.""17 The burden is on the ap-
pellant to establish an abuse of discretion.' 76
Appellate courts are also very reluctant to reverse modifications of
original custody orders because they are concerned with the policy con-
siderations of continuity in the children's living environment and finality
of custody litigation.1 77 Although generally it is rare that an appellate
court reverses a custody order, such reversals are common where they
have violated this policy.
178
174. Connolly v. Connolly (In re Marriage of Connolly), 23 Cal. 3d 590, 597-98, 591 P.2d
911, 914-15, 153 Cal. Rptr. 423, 427 (1979); B.G. v. San Bernardino County Welfare Dep't (In
re B.G.), 11 Cal. 3d 679, 698-99, 523 P.2d 244, 258, 114 Cal. Rptr. 444, 458 (1974); Holsinger
v. Holsinger, 44 Cal. 2d 132, 135, 279 P.2d 961, 963 (1955); Bookstein, 7 Cal. App. 3d at 224,
86 Cal. Rptr. at 499; Messer v. Messer, 259 Cal. App. 2d 507, 509, 66 Cal. Rptr. 417, 418
(1968). See also Schwartz v. Schwartz (In re Marriage of Schwartz), 104 Cal. App. 3d 92, 163
Cal. Rptr. 408 (1980) (abuse of discretion by trial court's making its ruling on basis of pre-
existing bias). See 2 C. MARKFY, supra note 30, § 12.51, at 22-45, for effect of trial court
discretion and rarity of reversals.
175. Connolly, 23 Cal. 3d at 598, 591 P.2d at 915, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 427; accord Carter v.
Carter (In re Marriage of Carter), 19 Cal. App. 3d 479, 494, 97 Cal. Rptr. 274, 282 (1971);
Troxell v. Troxell, 237 Cal. App. 2d 147, 152, 46 Cal. Rptr. 723, 726 (1965).
176. Blank v. Kirwan, 39 Cal. 3d 311, 331, 703 P.2d 58, 71, 216 Cal. Rptr. 718, 731 (1985).
177. See Carney, 24 Cal. 3d at 731, 598 P.2d at 38, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 385; Connolly, 214
Cal. App. 2d at 436, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 618.
178. Carney, 24 Cal. 3d at 731, 598 P.2d at 38, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 385; Connolly, 214 Cal.
App. 2d at 436, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 618; see, eg., Kern, 87 Cal. App. 3d at 410-11, 150 Cal. Rptr.
at 865; Russo, 21 Cal. App. 3d at 86, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 511; Martina, 214 Cal. App. 2d at 320-
21, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 383; Ashwell v. Ashwell, 135 Cal. App. 2d 211, 213, 286 P.2d 983, 984-85
(1955); Sorrels v. Sorrels, 105 Cal. App. 2d 465, 234 P.2d 103 (1951); Bemis v. Bemis, 89 Cal.
App. 2d 80, 200 P.2d 84 (1948). Family law courts have been even "'less reluctant to find an
abuse of discretion when custody is changed than when... originally awarded."' Carney, 24
Cal. 3d at 731, 598 P.2d at 38, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 385 (quoting Connolly v. Connolly (In re
Marriage of Connolly), 214 Cal. App. 2d 433, 436, 29 Cal. Rptr. 616, 618 (1963)); McLoren,
202 Cal. App. 3d at 113-14, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 900; Currin, 125 Cal. App. 2d at 651, 271 P.2d at
66 ("An appellate tribunal is not authorized to retry the issue of custody, nor to substitute its
judgment for that of the duly constituted arbiter of the facts.") The fumction of the appellate
court is "fully performed when [it] find[s] in the records substantial evidence which supports
the essential findings of the trial court." Hoffman v. Hoffman, 197 Cal. App. 2d 805, 812, 17
Cal. Rptr. 543, 547 (1961). Another court noted:
It is the trial court's responsibility to pass on the credibility of witnesses, the weight
to which their testimony is entitled, and the inferences to be drawn from the evi-
dence. On appeal it is, of course, the duty of this court to view the evidence and the
reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the suc-
cessful party in the court below.
Wood, 207 Cal. App. 2d at 36, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 262. In other words, an appellate court may
not be willing to find an abuse of discretion to overturn the trial court in modification proceed-
ings. As a result, most initial orders stand, but those orders that are able to be subsequently
modified have an even more difficult time being overturned at this stage than they did before.
Courts are reluctant to change custody orders unless a substantial reason exists. The courts
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III. IN RE MARRIAGE OF BIRNBAUM
Birnbaum v. Birnbaum (In re Marriage of Birnbaum) 179 involved a
"split and joint custody" arrangement in which both physical and legal
custody were held jointly. 80 The court in Birnbaum modified the initial
custody order regarding the length of time the children would reside with
each parent."8 This change was substantial and was arguably a "modifi-
cation" of the initial custody arrangement. The court, however, ex-
plained that changing the children's residential timetables was not a
modification in custody,'82 as defined in section 4600.5(i) of the Califor-
nia Civil Code.'83 The problem at issue in Birnbaum revolves around
whether changing the length of time in which children reside with each
have modified custody decrees in the following cases: Catherine D. v. Dennis B., 220 Cal.
App. 3d 922, 932-33, 269 Cal. Rptr. 547, 554 (1990) (affirmed change of custody to father after
mother repeatedly frustrated his visitation rights); Rosson, 178 Cal. App. 3d at 1101-02, 224
Cal. Rptr. at 255-56 (custodial parent's job-related decision to move from community which
children lived for significant period and in which noncustodial parent resides); Speelman, 152
Cal. App. 3d at 132-33, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 788-89 (custodial parent's frustration ofnoncustodial
parent's visitation rights); Dahl v. Dahl, 237 Cal. App. 2d 407, 409-11, 46 Cal. Rptr. 881, 882-
83 (1965) (father obtained place and persons to care for child while mother maintained open
illicit relationship with another man); Fauble v. Fauble, 219 Cal. App. 2d 682, 685-86, 33 Cal.
Rptr. 470, 471-72 (1963) (father's remarriage and, possession of ranch on which to keep chil-
dren, and mother's second divorce and failure to properly care for children); Loudermilk v.
Loudermilk, 208 Cal. App. 2d 705, 707-08, 25 Cal. Rptr. 434, 435-36 (1962) (mother's im-
proved health and remarriage which enabled her to care for child, and father's remarriage and
change of residence which limited mother's opportunity to visit and changed child's care-
taker); Stack v. Stack, 189 Cal. App. 2d 357, 370, 11 Cal. Rptr. 177, 182 (1961) (both parents'
remarriage and custodial mother's plan to remove child from state which would frustrate fa-
ther's visitation rights); Harris v. Harris, 186 Cal. App. 2d 788, 790-92, 9 Cal. Rptr. 300, 301-
02 (1960) (evidence mother not properly caring for child).
There are also some cases where courts have found that there was no change in circum-
stances which would permit a custody modification. For example, the California Supreme
Court has specifically held that a physical handicap that affects a parent's ability to participate
with his or her children in purely physical activities is not a sufficient change of circumstances
to justify a change in custody. Carney, 24 Cal. 3d at 740, 598 P.2d at 38, 157 Cal. Rptr. at
391. The court reasoned that basing a custody decision on a parent's physical handicap is
improper because the handicap stereotype fails to reach the heart of the parent-child relation-
ship. Id. "[Ilts essence lies in the ethical, emotional, and intellectual guidance the parent gives
to the child[ren] throughout [their] formative years, and often beyond." Id. The United States
Supreme Court has held that if the custodial parent marries a person of a different race than
either of the parents, this alone cannot justify a change in child custody. Palmore v. Sidoti,
466 U.S. 429, 434 (1984).
179. 211 Cal. App. 3d 1508, 260 Cal. Rptr. 210 (1989).
180. Birnbaum, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 1510-11, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 211; see also supra notes 38-
65 and accompanying text for an explanation of split and joint custody.
181. Birnbaum, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 1512, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 211.
182. Id. at 1513, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 213.
183. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600.5(i) (West Supp. 1990). See supra notes 144-52 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of the requirements of section 4600.5(i) of the California Civil Code.
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parent without changing the type of custody initially granted-that is,
joint legal and physical custody-is in fact equivalent to modifying a cus-
tody arrangement.
A. Statement of the Case
In August 1983, Lorene and Ira Birnbaum ended their marriage
through an interlocutory judgment of dissolution.184 A custody agree-
ment providing the parents with joint legal and physical custody of their
three daughters, aged three, five and seven, was incorporated into this
judgment from the parents' marital settlement agreement.' 8 5 The mari-
tal agreement provided that the first child's "primary residence" 186 was
with the mother, the second child's primary residence was with the fa-
ther and the schedule of the third child's primary residence would alter-
nate annually.'8 7  All three children were to live with Lorene on
weekdays and spend weekends and Wednesday afternoons with Ira dur-
ing the school year.1
88
In August 1986, three years after Lorene had moved from the city of
San Mateo to "the Coast Side" of San Mateo County, she filed a motion
to modify the existing joint custody order." 9 She sought sole custody of
184. Birnbaum v. Birnbaum (In re Marriage of Birnbaum), 211 Cal. App. 3d 1508, 1510,
260 Cal. Rptr. 210, 211 (1989).
185. Id.
186. The term "primary residence" was used only to enable the parent providing the pri-
mary residence to claim the child as a dependent for federal and state income tax purposes. Id.
at 1510 n.1, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 211 n.1.
187. Id. at 1510, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 211.
188. Id. at 1510-11, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 211. The court did not discuss residential arrange-
ments during summers or holidays because they were not at issue on appeal. The provisions
pursuant to an agreement incorporated into their interlocutory judgment of dissolution of mar-
riage provided that each parent was to have the children for half of these times each year. Id.
at 1511 n.2, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 211 n.2. The interlocutory judgment provided that the parents
were to alternate physical custody of the three children on the following cycle:
1. [Ira] to have the children from Friday after school until Monday morning and
each Wednesday afternoon from after school until 7:30 p.m.;
2. [Lorene] to have the children from Monday after the school day of each of them
until Friday morning at the beginning of school, with the exception of Wednesday
afternoons;
3. During school vacations, the parties were to have the same custodial days with
the children except that the exchange times on Mondays and Fridays were to be at
noon;
4. During the summer, the parties were to alternate custodial periods with the chil-
dren every two weeks, with [Ira] having the right to specify whether he wished to
have the first two-week block with him; provided, however, that the parent who pro-
vided the primary residence for each of the minor children during a particular year
shall have that child for one additional week during the summer.
Appellant's Opening Brief at 1-2, Birnbaum v. Birnbaum (In re Marriage of Birnbaum), 211
Cal. App. 3d 1508, 260 Cal. Rptr. 210 (1989) (No. AO40438).
189. .Birnbaum, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 1511, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 212.
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all three children and the limitation of Ira's school year visitation to al-
ternate weekends only.'90 Ira responded by moving for "sole physical
custody with reasonable visitation rights for Lorene."'' He objected to
the current arrangement because, he claimed, Lorene's move caused the
children to attend inferior schools.
1 92
At the initial hearing on these motions, the parties agreed to un-
dergo co-parenting counselling with a psychologist.1 93 The psychologist
made an evaluation and recommended a two-year plan providing for
"very nearly equal time."194 For each four-week period, the children
would live with Lorene on weekdays and with Ira on weekends for the
first two weeks.195 Then they would live one week with Lorene and the
following week with Ira.196 They would have Wednesday night dinners
with the parent with whom they were not then residing. 197 Lorene fa-
vored this proposal, but Ira wanted the court to reverse the scheduled
time with each parent in order to re-enroll the children in the San Mateo
City school system.
198
Having considered the psychologist's proposal as a general guide-
line, the trial court nevertheless adopted the reverse of the psychologist's
original plan. 99 Thus, for three weeks the children would reside with Ira
190. Id.
191. Id. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text for a definition of sole custody.
192. Birnbaum, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 1511, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 212.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1512, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 212. Some of the factors involved in the trial court's
custody determination were the parents' time with the children, the children's preferences and
visitation. Id. at 1511-12, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 212. The first factor is the amount of time parents
are available to spend with their children. Id.; see supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
Lorene complained that she had the children with her during the week, but not on the week-
ends, so she was unable to enjoy quality time with her children. Appellant's Opening Brief at
6, Birnbaum (No. A0-40438). She brought the original suit for this reason. Id. at 2. Ira
complained that Lorene had two foster children living with her and their daughters were left
alone to care for these children. Id. at 3. He, however, worked from his home so he would
have more time to co-parent their children. Id.
Second, the trial court also considered the children's preferences. Birnbaum, 211 Cal.
App. 3d at 1511-12, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 212; see supra notes 128-40 and accompanying text.
Emily told her father that she agreed with his plan to change her school. Id. at 9. Ariella said
she both agreed and disagreed but was concerned about leaving her friends. Id. Abigail told
her teacher on numerous occasions that she did not want to live with her father. Id. at 13. She
said that she was afraid to tell him anything. Id. at 14. However, there may be some testi-
mony from the children that they would have been willing to attend the San Mateo schools.
Respondent's Reply Brief at 12-13, Birnbaum v. Birnbaum (In re Marriage of Birnbaum), 211
Cal. App. 3d 1508, 260 Cal. Rptr. 210 (1989) (No. A0-40438). The trial court spoke with the
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during the week, spending weekends and Wednesday evenings with
Lorene.2 ' ° They then would live with Lorene for the fourth week and
spend the weekend and one evening with Ira.2 °0 The schedule would be
reversed during summer vacations. 20 2
Lorene filed a motion for reconsideration.2 "3 The trial court, after a
conference with the children, denied the motion to reconsider the cus-
tody order and refused to stay its order pending appeal.2' Lorene then
appealed from the trial court's order modifying her daughters' living ar-
rangements.20 5 The court of appeal affirmed the trial court's decision.
20 6
B. Reasoning of the Court of Appeal
Although the parties' appellate briefs treated the trial court's deci-
sion as a modification of child custody,20" the appellate court found that
there was no such change in custody.208 The trial court had ordered the
parents to continue sharing joint legal and physical custody.2 09 On ap-
peal, the court found that the only change was in the "co-parenting resi-
dential arrangement."21 0 In other words, the trial court had merely
rearranged the "children's residential timetable."' 211 Instead of living
with their mother during the week, the children would live with their
father.2 12 The court held that "when parents have joint physical custody
children in chambers, but it is unclear if the court's order followed their wishes. Birnbaum,
211 Cal. App. 3d at 1512, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 212-13.
The third factor is the willingness of parents to allow for visitation. Id. at 1511-12, 260
Cal. Rptr. at 212; see supra notes 120-27 and accompanying text. The trial court found that
Ira had "failed to completely embrace the concept of co-parenting and has taken a rigid
counter-productive approach to sharing time with these children." Respondent's Reply Brief
at 17, Birnbaum (No. A0-40438). Ira never allowed his former wife even to enjoy one
Mother's Day in four and one-half years with her children. See Birnbaum, 211 Cal. App. 3d
at 1511 n.4, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 212 n.4. He had the children on most weekends and chose to
deprive Lorene of the company of her children on this occasion. Respondent's Reply Brief at
17, Birnbaum (No. AO-40438). Visitation periods are not bargaining chips. Id. The trial
court then ordered Ira to pay Lorene's attorney's fees and the costs incurred by the psycholo-
gist's appearance because of his inflexibility and uncooperativeness. Id.
200. Birnbaum, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 1512, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 212.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. 260 Cal. Rptr. at 212-13.
205. Id. at 1510, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 211.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 1512, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 212.
208. Id. at 1513, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 213.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 1512, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 212.
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of their children, an order modifying the co-parenting residential ar-
rangement does not constitute a change in custody." '213
After determining that there was no custody change, the court ex-
plained the standard of appellate review in such cases.214 The court of
appeal's "'function [is] fully performed when [it] find[s] in the record
substantial evidence which supports the essential findings of the trial
court.' "215 The court explained that the function of the court of appeal
is not to "'reweigh conflicting evidence and redetermine' "216 the trial
court's findings. The court acknowledged that there were conflicts as to
the facts and the proper inferences to be drawn from them.2 17 The appel-
late court, however, noted that it "cannot second-guess a conscientious
and competent trial court," especially because the court "had the oppor-
tunity to observe the parents and the children personally."21 Thus, the
court reasoned that a change in the joint custody residential arrangement
could not be reversed on appeal.219
The court of appeal at the same time, however, recognized a rule
that would provide for the reversal of the trial court's order to modify
child custody.22 The trial court's discretion is not disturbed on appeal,
"'unless the record presents a clear case of abuse of that discretion.' ,,221
The test for such abuse of discretion is whether the trial court "'has
exceeded the bounds of reason.' "222 The appellate court in Birnbaum
held that there was no abuse of the trial court's broad discretion and
affirmed its decision.223
A significant portion of the appellate court's opinion discussed the
testimony offered in support of the San Mateo school system's excel-
lence.224 The court found that there was sufficient evidence to support
the trial court's findings that the San Mateo school was superior because
213. Id. at 1510, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 211.
214. Id. at 1513, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 213. See supra notes 165-77 and accompanying text for
discussion of appellate standard of review.
215. Birnbaum, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 1513, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 213 (quoting Sanchez v.
Sanchez, 55 Cal. 2d 118, 126, 358 P.2d 533, 538, 10 Cal. Rptr. 261, 266 (1961)).
216. Id. (quoting Sanchez v. Sanchez, 55 Cal. 2d at 126, 358 P.2d at 538, 10 Cal. Rptr. at
266).
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1518, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 216.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1512, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 213.
221. Id. (quoting Messer v. Messer, 259 Cal. App. 2d 507, 509, 66 Cal. Rptr. 417, 418
(1968)).
222. Id. (quoting Connolly v. Connolly (In re Marriage of Connolly), 23 Cal. 3d 590, 598,
591 P.2d 911, 914, 153 Cal. Rptr. 423, 427 (1979)).
223. Id. at 1510, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 211.
224. Id. at 1513-14, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 213-14.
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of its extensive extracurricular activities and honor courses.22 5 The court
recognized the conflicting testimony as to which parent lived in the better
school district and would be the better "school parent., 226 The court,
however, affirmed the trial court's finding that the San Mateo school was
superior. 2  The trial and appellate courts relied solely on Ira's testi-
mony as to the relative merits of the school systems.228 The court stated
that the "'testimony of a single witness, even the testimony of a party
himself, [is] sufficient'" evidence. 229 Thus, the court held that the evi-
dence as to the superiority of the San Mateo school system supported the
trial court's finding to alter the residential timetables.2 30
The Birnbaum court emphasized that the reason the Birnbaum's
child custody case ended up in the judicial system, and the underlying
reasoning for the court's holding, was the parents' failure to communi-
cate.231 The appellate court noted that the parents were inflexible and
unable to agree to even slight adjustments in the times that the children
would spend with each of them.23 2 They were incapable of cooperating
for their children's best interests because of their inability to communi-
cate with each other.233 Therefore, the trial and appellate judges had
been forced to act as "super-parent[s] and make parenting decisions the
parents themselves [could not] agree[] upon., 234 The trial court was em-
powered to decide that the "educational advantages offered by a particu-
lar school district justified] residing in that district, just as parents
themselves often utilize[d] this factor in choosing a residence. '2 35 The
appellate court recognized that trial courts possess broad discretion to
adjust co-parenting residential arrangements.2 36 Parents who force
courts to make such decisions have no basis for complaint.2 37 Thus, the
appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision.2 3 8
225. Id. at 1514, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 214.
226. Id. at 1513-14, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 213-14.
227. Id. at 1514, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 214.
228. Id. at 1513, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 213.
229. Id. (quoting Chodos v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 126 Cal. App. 3d 86, 97, 178 Cal.
Rptr. 831, 837 (1981)).
230. Id. at 1514, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 214.
231. Id. at 1517-18, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 216.
232. Id. at 1517, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 216.
233. Id. at 1517-18, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 216.
234. Id. at 1518, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 216.
235. Id. at 1518 n.7, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 216 n.7.
236. Id. at 1518, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 216.
237. Id.
238. Id.
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IV. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Established precedent and the California Civil Code provide that in
order to modify custody arrangements courts must follow certain guide-
lines.1 239 The Birnbaum court chose not to follow these strict require-
ments when it altered the children's periods of residency with each
parent. The court should not have played a semantic game in redefining
"modification." 2" The change in the initial custody order was clearly a
"modification" under section 4600.5(i) of the California Civil Code24'
and established case law because it completely altered the custody
arrangement.
The Birnbaum court's handling of this case is flawed for several rea-
sons. First, if the court had followed the strict requirements for child
custody modification as set forth in section 4600.5(i) of the California
Civil Code and Carney v. Carney (In re Marriage of Carney),242 the case
would have been reversed for a lack of a substantial change in circum-
stances.24 3 Second, the court's reasons for its decision are ill-founded
because of the nature of the evidence upon which it relied, 24 as well as
its failure to address important policy considerations, such as stability of
the children's environment. Finally, in addition to the inadequate basis
for the trial court's decision, the appellate court's new rule permitting the
change in residential timetables causes detrimental effects on children.245
As a result, the Birnbaum decision eliminates the strict requirements that
previously controlled child custody modification. This breakdown ren-
ders child custody modification law meaningless and permits any parent
who is unsatisfied with a joint custody arrangement to alter the custody
order.
V. ANALYSIS
A. Dangerous Departure from Precedent and Statutes
For a court lawfully to modify a child custody order before Birn-
baum v. Birnbaum (In re Marriage of Birnbaum),246 the court was re-
239. See supra notes 141-65 and accompanying text.
240. See infra notes 333-38 and accompanying text.
241. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600.5(i) (West Supp. 1990).
242. 24 Cal. 3d 725, 730, 598 P.2d 36, 38, 157 Cal. Rptr. 383, 385 (1979). "It is settled that
to justify ordering a change in custody there must generally be a persuasive showing of
changed circumstances affecting the child." Id.
243. See infra notes 246-62 and accompanying text.
244. See infra notes 315-24 and accompanying text for a discussion of Ira Bimbaum's
testimony.
245. See infra notes 339-51 and accompanying text.
246. 211 Cal. App. 3d 1508, 1512, 260 Cal. Rptr. 210, 212 (1989).
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quired to adhere to established case law, as well as section 4600.5() of
the California Civil Code,247 governing such a modification.248 These
laws' require: (1) that the modification be in the best interests of the
children,2"' and (2) that a substantial change in circumstances has arisen
thereby requiring a change in the initial order.25 ' The Birnbaum court
evaded these strict laws on child custody modification.25 2
If the court had applied the law correctly, the court probably would
not have been able to change the initial custody order. Lorene, the party
seeking the modification, had the burden of proving that the modification
was both in the best interests of the children and that it was required
because of a change in circumstances. 253 To meet the best interest stan-
dard, she should have shown that the children would be better off spend-
ing more time with her on weekends so that she could provide them with
the emotional support they required.254 If she had the children only dur-
ing the school week, she may not have been able to spend as much qual-
ity time with her children as she would have had during some
weekends.2 55 Even if Lorene could have proven that the best interests of
the children were to extend the amount of time they spent with her, she
would still need to show a change in circumstances. 256 Lorene had given
247. CAL. Civ. CODE § 4600.5(i) (West Supp. 1990).
248. See, eg., Carney v. Carney (In re Marriage of Carney), 24 Cal. 3d 730, 730-31, 598
P.2d 36, 38, 157 Cal. Rptr. 383, 385-86 (1979). See supra notes 141-59 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the modification requirements.
249. See supra notes 141-61 and accompanying text.
250. Carney, 24 Cal. 3d at 730, 598 P.2d at 38, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 385; see supra notes 148-
52.
251. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600.5(i). Section 4600.5(i) sets forth that modification must be in
the best interests of the child, whereas case law establishes that a change in circumstances is
required. See supra notes 153-61 and accompanying text.
252. Perhaps the court realized that there was not a substantial change in circumstances,
but desired to change the custody arrangement anyway. By inventing the terminology, "co-
parenting residential arrangement," the court avoided the established rules for modifying cus-
tody orders.
253. See supra notes 141-61 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 148-52 and accompanying text. The trial court noted that the mother
provided the girls with emotional responses, sensitivity, and social development. Respondent's
Reply Brief at 5-6, Birnbaum (No. A0-40438).
255. Lorene worked during the week and may have preferred to spend her days off with her
children on the weekend. During the week her children were in school and probably partici-
pated in extracurricular activities after school. When they returned home, it is likely that the
children did their homework. This would not leave too much quality time for the children to
spend with their mother.
256. It is highly improbable that Lorene could show a change in circumstances merely
because of her desire to spend quality time with her children. See Carney v. Carney (In re
Marriage of Carney), 24 Cal. 3d 725, 731-33, 598 P.2d 36, 39-40, 157 Cal. Rptr. 383, 386
(1979), for a discussion of mother's attempt to carry burden of showing changed
circumstances.
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no evidence that there was such a change in circumstances.
Ira, on the other hand, may have refuted Lorene's claims by demon-
strating that it was in the best interests for the children to live with him
during the school week.257 The fact that Ira resided in the San Mateo
school district was a factor in his favor.258 This fact allowed Ira to con-
tend that it was better for the children to live with him on weekdays so
that they could obtain a better education.2" 9 His claim could have been
approached as one for modification. A valid argument may have been
that a modification was necessary to provide the children with a better
education. This reason, however, would not have amounted to a sub-
stantial change in circumstances.2 " This educational reason alone
should not be enough to alter children's living arrangements. Although
education is an important factor in child custody modification, it is not
the only consideration.261 No cases have stated that the location of a
school district alone is a sufficient basis to modify custody.262 Neither
Ira nor Lorene would have met the standards for modification. Thus, the
257. See supra notes 148-52 and accompanying text.
258. See Birnbaum, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 1514, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 213 (joint custody arrange-
ment changed to make father "school parent" because district system in which former hus-
band resided was superior to that in which wife resided).
259. Id.
260. There are many factors involved in child custody modification and it seems that one
factor alone, such as education in high school, may not be considered a change in circum-
stances. See, eg., Rosson v. Rosson (In re Marriage of Rosson), 178 Cal. App. 3d 1094, 1102,
224 Cal. Rptr. 250, 256 (1986) (children's primary physical residence was with mother, but
was modified when she moved based on need for stable environment and father's testimony
about his involvement with children's academic, athletic, social, and religious activities).
261. See Rosson, 178 Cal. App. 3d at 1102, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 256 (children's primary physi-
cal residence was with mother, but modified when she moved based on need for stability of
environment and father's testimony about his involvement with children's academic, athletic,
social, and religious activities); Curry v. Curry, 218 Cal. App. 2d 651, 655-56, 32 Cal. Rptr.
600, 602-03 (1963) (no modification of custody award allowed where child would be removed
from school in Nebraska to school in California with strangers and strange surroundings);
Cunningham v. Cunningham, 217 Cal. App. 2d 65, 67-68, 31 Cal. Rptr. 448,449 (1963) (court
believed not in best interest of boy of 15 to change custody and remove him from high school
that he attended for one year); Cddington v. Coddington, 210 Cal. App. 2d 96, 99-101, 26
Cal. Rptr. 431, 433-34 (1962) (trial court changed sole custody from mother of 11 year-old girl
to joint custody with physical custody to father during school year because she was below
average in reading and step-mother helped to improve her reading during summer and would
continue to help); Disney v. Disney, 121 Cal. App. 2d 602, 607-08, 263 P.2d 865, 868-69
(1953) (court modified custody because of mother's ineffective supervision and guidance of one
of her two sons who skipped classes, did not study, went out on school nights and received
lower grades and because court determined that male supervision of teenaged years would be
more effective).
262. See, eg, Curry, 218 Cal. App. 2d at 655-56, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 602-03; Cunningham, 217
Cal. App. 2d at 67-68, 31 Cal. Rptr. at 449; Disney, 121 Cal. App. 2d at 607-08, 283 P.2d at
263.
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effect of the Birnbaum case was to establish a new rule allowing for
changes in the residential timetable merely because one parent preferred
a different custody arrangement.
B. Residence and Custody
Sections 4600 and 4600.5 of the California Civil Code263 do not
clearly define child custody.264 The statutes briefly define a variety of
custody arrangements, but do not specify precisely the types of arrange-
ments that may be embodied in a joint physical and legal custody
award.26 The Birnbaum court initially awarded the parents joint physi-
cal and joint legal custody.266 The parents shared in the physical custody
by alternating the children's residence.267 It follows that any change in
residence from the initial custody agreement is a change in physical cus-
tody. Therefore, physical custody is, in essence, equivalent to residence
and any alteration in the children's physical custody from the initial or-
der changes the entire nature of the custody order.
The trial court in Birnbaum initially defined specific periods in
which the children would reside with each of their parents.268 The trial
court later reversed these time periods from the initial order.269 By
changing the timetable of actual physical custody, or what the court
termed the "co-parenting residential arrangement, ' 270 the court effec-
tively modified the custody arrangement. The court modified the ar-
rangement because it was significantly different from the original custody
agreement for the children to live with their father during the week, their
mother on weekends for three weeks of the month and the reverse for
every fourth week. If the appellate court had simply looked at the face of
the initial custody agreement and compared it with the one that resulted
after this decision, it should have been perfectly clear that there had been
a modification in the custody order.
C. The Real Crux of the Problem
The court's reasoning in Birnbaum271 demonstrates the problems
263. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4600, 4600.5 (West Supp. 1990).
264. See supra notes 20-37 and accompanying text.
265. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4600, 4600.5(d); see also supra notes 20-60 and accompanying
text.
266. Birnbaum, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 1512, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 212.
267. Appellant's Opening Brief at 1-2, Birnbaum (No. A0-40438).
268. Birnbaum, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 1510-11, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 211.
269. Id. at 1512, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 212.
270. Id at 1513, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 213.
271. 211 Cal. App. 3d 1508, 260 Cal. Rptr. 210 (1989).
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involved in modifying custody orders and the detrimental effect of con-
stant changes in a child's environment. Though these problems are sig-
nificant,272 Birnbaum will have an even more dramatic affect on future
cases because all lower courts are bound to follow this decision. 273 The
hidden analysis that the court followed to reach this decision will affect
all future decisions in this area. The Birnbaum court did not specifically
address the problems arising from the vague definitions of joint cus-
tody274 as defined by section 4600.5 of the California Civil Code.275 The
court was, however, able to use this definition of joint custody as a loop-
hole to provide for the change in the "co-parenting residential arrange-
ment. ' 276 Section 4600.5 does not state the type of parenting plans that
may be established in joint custody arrangements.277 It follows that
272. See infra notes 284-312 and accompanying text.
273. Auto Equity Sales v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 450, 455-56, 36 P.2d 937, 940, 20 Cal.
Rptr. 321, 324 (1962).
[D]ecisions of... [the California Supreme Court] are binding upon and must be
followed by all the state courts of California. Decisions of every division of the Dis-
trict Courts of Appeal are binding upon all the justice and municipal courts and upon
all superior courts of this state, and this is so whether or not the superior court is
acting as a trial or appellate court. Courts exercising inferior jurisdiction must ac-
cept the law declared by courts of superior jurisdiction.
Of course, the rule under discussion has no application where there is more than
one appellate court decision, and such appellate decisions are in conflict. In such a
situation, the court exercising inferior jurisdiction can and must make a choice be-
tween the conflicting decisions.
Id
The courts are slowly chipping away at the meaning of Birnbaum v. Birnbaum. See
Fingert v. Fingert (In re Marriage of Fingert), 221 Cal. App. 3d 1575, 1579, 271 Cal. Rptr.
389, 391 (1990) (abuse of discretion found where trial court's order would force mother to
move or else give up custody). The court, disagreeing with the language in Birnbaum, stated:
[The Birnbaum court has stated that] "if parents with joint physical custody are
unable to modify residential arrangements for their children and call upon the court
to do so, they have no basis to complain about the decision that is made." It must be
acknowledged [, however,] that all litigation is brought about by those who are un-
able to settle their disputes. We do not choose to chastise parents who fail to make
mutually agreeable coparenting residential arrangements by suggesting that, by such
failure, they will have to accept whatever decision a trial court decides. We shall
adhere to the standard of review announced by the Supreme Court.
Id (quoting Birnbaum v. Birnbaum (In re Marriage of Birnbaum), 211 Cal. App. 3d 1508,
1518, 260 Cal. Rptr. 210, 216 (1989)).
274. See Birnbaum, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 1515, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 214. The court stated that
"[ilt is doubtful that any two words mean as many different things to as many different people
as the words 'joint custody.' The statutory definition, having to cover the wide variety of
arrangements parents make when they have joint custody, is necessarily broad and does not
provide much guidance." Id.
275. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600.5 (West Supp. 1990).
276. Birnbaum, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 1513, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 213.
277. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600.5(d). Joint custody means joint legal and physical cus-
tody. Id § 4600(d)(1). "'Joint physical custody' means that each of the parents shall have
significant periods of physical custody. Joint physical custody shall be shared by the parents in
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switching the residential timetables of a child is not covered under sec-
tion 4600.5(d). If this concept of altering timetables is not defined in
custody, then it logically follows that there could not possibly be a modi-
fication in joint custody where the time spent at the parents' homes are
merely rearranged. Thus, the court was able to grant a change in the
residential timetables simply by taking advantage of the section's very
general definition of joint custody.278
The current definition of joint custody is so general that it has no
real meaning at all.279 This problem of freely changing residential ar-
rangements would not need to be addressed if the California legislature
clearly defined joint custody.280 A clear definition of joint custody would
prevent courts from circumventing modification requirements by calling
a change in custody merely a "rearrangement of the children's residential
timetables."' 281  If the legislature re-defined joint custody2 2 to include
such a way as to assure a child of frequent and continuing contact with both parents." Id.
§ 4600(d)(3). "'Joint legal custody' means that both parents shall share the right and the
responsibility to make the decisions relating to the health, education, and welfare of a child."
Id. § 4600(d)(5).
278. Id § 4600.5.
279. See supra notes 38-51 and accompanying text.
280. See infra note 282.
281. Birnbaum, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 1513, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 213.
282. See, eg., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 602.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990).
Joint custody means custody determined pursuant to a Joint Parenting Agreement or
a Joint Parenting Order. In such cases, the court shall initially request the parents to
produce a Joint Parenting Agreement. Such Agreement shall specify each parent's
powers, rights and responsibilities for the personal care of the child and for major
decisions such as education, health care, and religious training. The Agreement shall
further specify a procedure by which proposed changes, disputes and alleged
breaches may be mediated or otherwise resolved and shall provide for periodic review
of its terms by the parents.
Id. para. 602.1(b). The parents must be flexible in arriving at resolutions which further the
state's policies. Id. The court may also order mediation to assist the court in making a deter-
mination of whether a joint custody order is appropriate. Id. If the parents fail to produce an
agreement, the court can enter a joint parenting order following the same specifications as a
joint parenting agreement. Id.; see also COLO. REv. STAT. § 14-10-123.5 (1987) (statute re-
quires parents to implement plan for joint custody for court's approval).
In order to implement joint custody, both parties may submit a plan or plans for the
court's approval. If no plan is submitted or if the court does not approve a submitted
plan, the court, on its own motion, shall formulate a plan which shall address and
resolve, where applicable, the parties' arrangements for the following:
(a) The location of both parties, the periods of time during which each party
will have physical custody of the child, and the legal residence of the child;
(b) The child's education;
(c) The child's religious training, if any;
(d) The child's health care;
(e) Finances to provide for the child's needs;
(f) Holidays and vacations; and
(g) Any other factors affecting the physical or emotional health and well-being
of the child.
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residential timetables, a court could not so easily modify a joint custody
order simply by calling its action a change in the "co-parenting residen-
tial arrangement.1283  The party trying to alter the arrangement, thus,
would have to prove a substantial change in circumstances had occurred
in order to modify the custody arrangement.
D. Stability and Children's Best Interests
The lack of finality in child custody decisions conflicts with the need
COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-123.5(3). The court may order mediation to assist the parties in
formulating, modifying, or implementing the plan which must be jointly agreed to by the par-
ties. Id. § 14-10-123.5 (4), (5). In determining whether joint custody is in the best interests of
the child, the court must consider the following factors:
(1) whether the child has established a close relationship with each parent;
(2) whether each parent is capable of providing adequate care for the child
throughout each period of responsibility, including arranging for the child's care by
others as needed;
(3) whether each parent is willing to accept all responsibilities of parenting, in-
cluding willingness to accept care of the child at specified times and relinquish care to
the other parent at specified times;
(4) whether the child can best maintain and strengthen a relationship with both
parents through predictable, frequent contact and whether the child's development
will profit from such involvement and influence from both parents;
(5) whether each parent is able to allow the other to provide care without intru-
sion, that is, respect the other's parental rights and responsibilities and his or her
right to privacy;
(6) the suitability of a parenting plan for the implementation of joint custody,
preferably, although not necessarily, one arrived at through parental agreement;
(7) geographic distance between the parent's residences; and
(8) willingness or ability of the parent to communicate, cooperate or agree on
issues regarding the child's needs.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9.1B (1978). Once the court awards joint custody, the court must
approve a parenting plan for the implementation of the prospective custody arrangement
before joint custody is awarded. Id. § 40.4-9. IF. The parenting plan must include a division
of the child's time and care into periods of responsibility for each parent. Id. (emphasis ad-
ded). The plan may also include:
(1) statements regarding the child's religion, education, child care, recreational
activities and medical and dental care;
(2) designation of specific decision-making responsibilities;
(3) methods of communicating information about the child, transporting the
child, exchanging care for the child and maintaining telephone and mail contact be-
tween parent and child;
(4) procedures for future decision-making, including procedures for dispute res-
olution; and
(5) other statements regarding the welfare of the child or designed to clarify and
facilitate parenting under joint custody arrangements.
Id. § 40-4-9.1F; see also MICH. STAT. ANN. § 25.312(6a) (Callaghan 1984) (joint custody
means either court order where child resides alternatively for specific time periods with each
parent or arrangement where parents share decision-making authority as to important deci-
sions affecting child's welfare). See infra notes 352-59 and accompanying text for possible
remedies.
283. Birnbaum, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 1513, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 213.
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for continuity of relationships between parents and the child.2 8 4 Psycho-
analytic theory casts doubts on divorce proceedings which leave relation-
ships uncertain throughout childhood.2 8 5 Uncertainty is always present
when custody proceedings are subject to modification.2 86 This uncer-
tainty violates a policy to maintain stability in the child's life.287 Chil-
dren require stable external arrangements for healthy development.288
They need to maintain continuous, unconditional and permanent rela-
tionships with at least one adult parent.2 89 Child placement arrange-
ments should safeguard this need for continuity of relationships,
surroundings and environmental influences.290 The Birnbaum court ig-
nored the children's needs for stability of relationships and environment.
By manipulating the child's external environment-such as with
which parent the child resides-the Birnbaum court has dramatically af-
fected the Birnbaum children's upbringing.2 9 1 By changing the schedules
to which the Birnbaum children were accustomed, the trial court seemed
to disregard the importance of the children's living with their mother
under the original custody agreement for three years. 292 Moreover, the
children had attended schools in the El Granada school system for four
284. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SoLNrr, supra note 92, at 37. "[A] major factor in
reducing the immediate disturbing effects on children is the continuation of their relationship
with both parents." Richards, supra note 36, at 83.
285. BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 19, at 6.
286. Id.
287. Burchard v. Garay, 42 Cal. 3d 531, 535, 724 P.2d 486, 488, 229 Cal. Rptr. 800, 802
(1986); Carney v. Carney (In re Marriage of Carney), 24 Cal. 3d 725, 730-31, 598 P.2d 36, 38,
157 Cal. Rptr. 383, 385 (1979).
288. BEYOND THE BEST INTEREs, supra note 19, at 31-32.
289. See id. at 99. A child's positive adjustment to the situations resulting from her par-
ents' divorce may be conditioned on the child's not feeling rejected by her parents. I. WAL-
LERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 19, at 48. In addition, "children's behaviors [are] strongly
affected by the quality of their relationships with their parents." M. LITTLE, FAMILY
BREAKUP 166 (1982). There is a high correlation between the parent-child relationship and
the adjustment of the child. Id. at 167. A child will suffer fewer negative consequences if he or
she is able to retain a warm relationship with at least one parent. Id. at 161. "[T]he most
crucial correlates of the child's later well-being appear to reside in the ways he experiences the
quality of both the pre and postseparation relationships to each of the parents and his capacity
to make peace within himself with their meaning." L. TESSMAN, CHILDREN OF PARTING
PARENTS 525 (1978). See Richards, supra note 36, at 83.
290. McLoren v. McLoren (In re Marriage of McLoren), 202 Cal. App. 3d 108, 113, 247
Cal. Rptr. 897, 900 (1988); see Sam E. v. Stahl (Guardianship of Claralyn S.), 148 Oil App.
3d 81, 85-87, 195 Cal. Rptr. 646, 649 (1983); Stoker v. Kinney (In re Marriage of Stoker), 65
Cal. App. 3d 878, 881, 135 Cal. Rptr. 616, 618 (1977); Mehlmauer v. Mehlmauer (In re Mar-
riage of Mehlmauer), 60 Cal. App. 3d 104, 109, 131 Cal. Rptr. 325, 328-29 (1976); Lawrence v.
Lawrence, 165 Cal. App. 2d 789, 792-93, 332 P.2d 305, 308 (1958).
291. See infra notes 292-312 and accompanying text.
292. Birnbaum v. Birnbaum (In re Marriage of Birnbaum), 211 Cal. App. 3d 1508, 15 10-11,
260 Cal. Rptr. 210, 211 (1989).
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and one-half years.29 3 The court failed to recognize the children's need
for continuity of both their affectionate and stimulating relationships
with their parents and their educational development.2 94 The children
would have been best served by remaining in a stable environment. 9
Studies have shown that disruptions of established patterns of care and
emotional bonds have a variety of detrimental consequences on
children.
29 6
The court in Birnbaum ignored these concerns by establishing a
malleable standard for changing custody arrangements. The court's in-
terpretation of the inapplicability of the modification standards allows
custody decisions to extend over a period of years. Parents can go to
court at any time and alter the timetables of their joint custody orders
without being subject to the safeguards inherent in California's definition
of "modification." 97 By prolonging the grant of a final decision on cus-
tody determinations in this way, the court creates great uncertainty in
children's lives.298 If courts are permitted to reconsider the residential
293. Id.
294. BEYOND THE BEsT INTERESTS, supra note 19, at 6-7. See Burchard, 42 Cal. 3d at
535, 53841, 724 P.2d at 488-93, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 802-07, for an explanation of the importance
of stability in children's lives.
295. See Rosson v. Rosson (In re Marriage of Rosson), 178 Cal. App. 3d 1094, 1101, 224
Cal. Rptr. 250, 255 (1986) (court considered positively that children had lived in same envi-
ronment virtually all their lives).
296. BEYOND THE BESr INTERESTS, supra note 19, at 11; cf Burchard, 42 Cal. 3d at 541,
724 P.2d at 492-93, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 806-07 (court stresses importance of stability in chil-
dren's lives and harm that may result from discrepancies of "established patterns of care and
emotional bonds"). Infants and toddlers become attached to their caretakers at an early age.
BEYOND THE BEsT INTERESTS, supra note 19, at 32-33. Such attachment is effectively pro-
moted by the constant, uninterrupted presence and attention of a familiar adult. Id. However,
this attachment can be easily upset by separating infants from their caretaker. Id. at 33. When
infants are abandoned by their parents, they may suffer separation distress, anxiety and set-
backs in the quality of their subsequent attachments. Id. This situation results in their being
less trustful and causes a lack of warmth in their contacts with others. Id.
With young children under five years, disruption of the parent-child relationship can af-
fect the children's achievements which are rooted and developed in an intimate interchange
with a stable parent figure. Id. For example, a disruption of the parent-child relationship may
affect their toilet training and their ability to communicate verbally. Id.
School-age children are also affected by disruption of the parent-child relationship. Id.
Their achievements are "based on identification with their parents' demands, prohibitions and
social ideals." Id. This identification develops where attachments are stable, but children may
abandon such achievements if the children themselves feel abandoned by their parents. Id.
The result may be that the children resent the adults who disappoint them, and may lead the
children into making the new parent a scapegoat for the shortcomings of the former parent.
Id. at 34.
297. For a discussion of the modification requirements defined in section 4600.5(i) of the
California Civil Code and California case law, see supra notes 141-61 and accompanying text.
298. Santa Clara County Dep't of Soc. Serv. v. Gloria S. (In re Micah S.), 198 Cal. App. 3d
557, 566-68, 243 Cal. Rptr. 756, 761-63 (1988) (court places children's welfare at top of hierar-
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timetables at the whim of either parent, there is no stability in a custody
award.
Aside from this concern of uncertainty, it is also difficult for chil-
dren to relate positively to, profit from, and maintain contact with two
parents who have constant hostility toward each other.2 99 This predica-
ment that the children experience is especially true when the parents
themselves are unable to communicate with each other.3co Loyalty con-
flicts commonly result in custody battles and may destroy the children's
positive relationships with both parents.30 1 A better rule would be to
prevent the court's decisions from shifting back and forth between com-
peting complainants3"2 and to limit the situations in which modification
is permitted.30 3 Any alteration of custody orders should be granted only
under strict standards when a substantial change in circumstances affect-
ing the children's best interests has arisen.
If the Birnbaum court had addressed these concerns, the court may
have left custody with Lorene during the school year. Lorene played an
active role in their children's school life and extracurricular activities.3°
Lorene requested to have some additional time with her children on the
weekends rather than only during the school week.30 5 Since the
Birnbaums were unable to agree upon a reasonable amount of weekend
time for the children to spend with Lorene, she brought her case to the
courts to be resolved.30 6 She had requested on a number of occasions a
chy of values and recognizes dangers of procrastination (citing J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A.
SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 38-39 (1979))).
299. BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 19, at 38.
300. "[C]hildren do least well [in dealing with a divorce] when there is a lot of conflict
between parents during and after the divorce. This seems to be because inter-parental conflict
is very corrosive of parent-child relationships." Richards, supra note 36, at 84.
301. McLoren, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 214, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 900 (intense loyalty conflict
between parents experienced by both children throughout custody litigation); Richards, supra
note 36, at 84. When loyalty conflicts arise, the children may feel that they cannot be loyal to
one parent without jeopardizing their relationships with the other parent. See J. WALLER-
STEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 19, at 49, 70-71, 88. As a result of these circumstances, the
children's attempts to gain approval of their parents may become even more difficult. See id.
302. BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 19, at 39. Goldstein, Freud and Solnit
suggest that the best solution short of having the courts relinquish their involvement in cus-
tody disputes, would be for the courts to make a final decision, allowing appeals or modifica-
tions only during a period immediately following the court's decision. Id. at 38-39. The
authors suggest that the statutes should not provide for modification at any other time. Id. at
49.
303. See infra notes 352-59 and accompanying text.
304. Appellant's Opening Brief at 10, 13, Birnbaum v. Birnbaum (In re Marriage of Birn-
baum), 211 Cal. App. 3d 1508, 260 Cal. Rptr. 210 (1989) (No. A0-40438).
305. Id. at 6.
306. Id. at 9.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIE W [Vol. 24:467
change in her visitation schedule with the children, but had been turned
down by Ira.3" 7 Ira responded to Lorene's lawsuit by asking for a change
in custody so that the children could live with him during the majority of
the year and attend a new school.30 8
In granting Ira's request, the court uprooted the children from a
comfortable environment and placed them in a new living situation and a
different school with an entirely new group of children.30 9 One commen-
tator has suggested that children in such situations may have some diffi-
culty adjusting,31° especially after living with their mothers for several
years and attending school with the same group of children.311 Thus, the
Birnbaum court overlooked these factors and failed to consider the chil-
dren's best interests in remaining with their mother under the original
custody arrangement.31 2
E. Superior Schools-an Invalid Basis for the Court's Decision
In Birnbaum, the court erroneously based its custody decision on
the quality of education at the schools. 313 There was "no evidence in the
record to support the court's finding in it's [sic] Statement of Decision
that enrollment" in the San Mateo schools "would provide the children
with a greater variety of educational and enrichment options than they
presently enjoy[ed]. 3 14 The only testimony about the relative merits of
307. Id. Lorene had asked for years if she could have one weekend a month with the
children, but Ira refused. Id He also would not change either days or times for visits unless
Lorene switched other days or times in return. Id. On one occasion Lorene had cousins visit-
ing and requested the girls be allowed to stay and visit their relatives, but Ira refused since it
was on a weekend. Id. Lorene also was not able to have a Mother's Day with the children
until 1987. Id. at 9-10.
308. Birnbaum, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 1511, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 212.
309. The Birnbaum children previously attended the El Granada schools in the Cabrillo
District. Appellant's Opening Brief at 10, Birnbaum (No. A0-40438). This school was a one-
mile bus ride from their home. Id. The children preferred to take the bus, rather than drive
with their mother, so that they could socialize with their friends. Id. Now under the revised
custody arrangement, they must attend school in the San Mateo School District. Id. at 11.
310. BEYOND THE BEsT INTERESt, supra note 19, at 34.
311. Appellant's Opening Brief at 19, Birnbaum (No. A0-40438) (children had been in
same school system for last four years).
312. See Burchard, 42 Cal. 3d at 538, 724 P.2d at 492-93, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 806-07 (court
stressed "importance of stability and continuity in the life of a child and the harm that may
result from disruption of established patterns of care and emotional bonds").
313. Birnbaum v. Birnbaum (In re Marriage of Birnbaum), 211 Cal. App. 3d 1508, 1513-14,
260 Cal. Rptr. 210, 213-14 (1989).
314. Appellant's Opening Brief at 21, Birnbaum (No. A0-40438). The only evidence before
the court as to the superiority of the San Mateo school system was Ira's opinion. Birnbaum,
211 Cal. App. 3d at 1513, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 213.
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the school systems was given by Ira."i He explained that recent newspa-
per articles cited the elementary school, which the children would attend,
as "one of two schools out of six thousand in the state to be named as an
outstanding school." '3 1 6 He also contacted the schools about extracurric-
ular activities and comparative test scores and found that the Cabrillo
school district, where the mother resides, did not provide educational
diversity or the enrichment available at the San Mateo school.3 17 Ira
testified that Cabrillo administrators told him that the school offered no
electives or honors courses.31 8 Lorene did not object to this testimony,
thus, the court admitted this evidence even though it was hearsay.31 9
Ira further stated his opinion that the San Mateo school provides a
better education for the children.3 20 The court also admitted Ira's opin-
ion which could have been excluded as "inadmissible lay opinion."321
The trial court should have required more than merely Ira's testimony
that the San Mateo school was superior.322 At the trial level, experts or
315. Birnbaum, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 1513, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 213.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 1514, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 213.
318. Id.
319. Had Lorene objected to Ira's testimony, the court should not admit his testimony be-
cause it was hearsay. Id. at 1513 & n.5, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 213 & n.5. Hearsay is "evidence of a
statement that was made other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing and that is
offered to prove the truth of the matter stated." CAL. EVID. CODE § 1200(a) (West 1966 &
Supp. 1990). Hearsay evidence is inadmissible. Id. § 1200(b). Thus, Ira's testimony as to
what another person has said violates the hearsay rule, and this testimony is inadmissible. The
court noted that Lorene did not object to this testimony as either hearsay or inadmissible lay
opinion. Birnbaum, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 1513 n.5, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 213 n.5. Her counsel,
therefore, failed or chose not to make the proper objection to this testimony.
320. Birnbaum, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 1513-14, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 213-14.
321. Section 800 of the California Evidence Code limits opinion of lay testimony as follows:
"Testimony in the form of an opinion is limited to such an opinion as is permitted by law,
including but not limited to an opinion that is: (a) Rationally based on the perception of the
witness; and (b) Helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony." CAL. EVID. CODE § 800
(West 1966 & Supp. 1990). In addition, section 803 of the California Evidence Code explains:
The court may, and upon objection shall, exclude testimony in the form of an opin-
ion that is based in whole or in significant part on [a] matter that is not a proper basis
for such an opinion. In such [a] case, the witness may, if there remains a proper basis
for his opinion, then state his opinion after excluding from consideration the matter
determined to be improper.
Id. § 803.
322. See Forsund v. Forsund, 225 Cal. App. 2d 476, 499-500, 37 Cal. Rptr. 489, 504-05
(1964) (trial court award can be reversed for abuse of discretion despite fact that some evi-
dence in support was substantial evidence). Substantial evidence is evidence which is reason-
able in nature, credible and of solid weight. Id. at 499, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 504. But see Chodos v.
Insurance Co. of N. Am., 126 Cal. App. 3d 86, 97, 178 Cal. Rptr. 831, 837 (1981). The court
in Chodos explained that:
[A] judgment must be upheld on appeal in the face of a challenge to the sufficiency of
evidence if it can be said that the judgment is supported by substantial evidence. The
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school administrators from these school districts and others should have
testified.323 The court of appeal should not have so easily relied on the
sole testimony of Ira, especially because he was biased and an interested
party.
324
Even assuming the San Mateo school was superior, the court ne-
glected to consider Lorene's active role in her children's education.
Lorene was very involved in both school and after-school programs.325
She attended all school field trips and activities.326 She also worked as a
volunteer in the Cabrillo school system one day a week in each of her
children's classes until she became a full-time paid teacher's aide in
March 1987.327 Thus, regardless of the differences in the schools' extra-
curricular programs, Lorene's involvement in her children's schools was
significant and contributed to their education.328
The court's belief that Ira would be the better school parent seems
to have no support. Ira did not attend any school functions, 32 9 nor did
he take an active interest in the children's education. 330 The first time
test, however, is not whether there is substantial conflict, but whether there is "sub-
stantial evidence" in favor of the respondent. If this "substantial evidence" is pres-
ent, no matter how slight it may appear in comparison with the contradictory
evidence, the judgment will be affirmed. In brief, the appellate court ordinarily looks
only at the evidence supporting the successful party, and disregards the contrary
showing.
Id. (citations omitted).
323. Since Lorene's motion for reconsideration included declarations from El Granada
school personnel about the quality of the school system, the trial court should have allowed
declarants to testify, rather than to summarily state that "'the testimony of a single witness,
even the party himself may be sufficient."' Birnbaum, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 1512-13, 260 Cal.
Rptr. at 212-13 (quoting Chodos v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 126 Cal. App. 3d 86, 97, 178
Cal. Rptr. 831, 837 (1981)).
324. Because Ira has a stake in the outcome of the case, he has an interest in the court's
decision. As a result, his views would be biased in his favor. Lorene did not object to Ira's
testimony either as hearsay or as inadmissible opinion. Id. at 1513 n.5, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 213
n.5. Her attorney should have made these objections. The court's decision does not indicate
what evidence was given by Lorene to refute this testimony. Id. at 1513, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 213.
Lorene contended that the trial court findings of the superiority of the San Mateo school sys-
tem was unsupported and that there was contrary evidence. Id.
325. Appellant's Opening Brief at 10, 13, Birnbaum (No. A0-40438).
326. Id. at 13.
327. Id. at 10, 12. Lorene worked Monday through Friday from 8:30 a.m. until 2:30 p.m.
Id. at 10.
328. Id. at 11. Cliff Ellyn, a teacher at El Granada, "stated that the El Granada school was
a good school with tremendous professional staff and after school options." Id. at 12. The
school has swimming, soccer, music and dance programs after school. Id. at 12-13. The prin-
cipal of El Granada elementary school indicated that the El Granada School offered students
both academic and enrichment activities, including fine arts activities, music training, field
trips and a gifted and talented student program. Id. at 14.
329. Id. at 14.
330. Id. at 11.
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Ira even raised the question about the superiority of the San Mateo
school was after Lorene had filed her motion requesting that she be al-
lowed a weekend visit.33 ' Despite the nature of the testimony and
Lorene's academic and emotional involvement with her children, the
court still found that the father was best suited to foster the children's
academic careers.33 2
F. A Question of Semantics
By allowing the children to be moved from one parent to the other
without requiring proof of changed circumstances, the court of appeal in
Birnbaum merely engaged in a semantic game. The court re-labelled a
modification of the custody arrangement as a mere change in "co-parent-
ing residential arrangements"3 33 and, thus, avoided the modification re-
quirements altogether. As a result, the concept of custody and the strict
requirements for modifying custody orders may have become diluted.334
The court permitted the parents to refrain from proving a change in cir-
cumstances and simply allowed them to restructure the living arrange-
ments. Commentators have noted that "most family law attorneys
would have bet ... that moving the kids from one parent to the other
required a custody change.' 335 The holding in Birnbaum suggests that
"as long as the label stays the same, the 'restructure' can be as drastic as
a total reversal of the former plan. ' 336 The result is achieved with a
lesser burden of proof than is required by a change in custody.3 37 The
outcome of this decision is that in a case where parents initially have
joint physical and joint legal custody and will continue to have this type
of custody arrangement, the courts can play with the living arrangements
without finding a change in circumstances.33 8
G. Changing Role of the Court
As a result of the decision in Birnbaum v. Birnbaum (In re Marriage
331. Id. at 10. It is possible that Ira desired this change so that he could antagonize Lorene
because they were unable to communicate otherwise. He also may have responded in this way
because Lorene initiated the proceedings to change the visitation.
332. Birnbaum, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 1514, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 214.
333. Id. at 1510, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 211.
334. Trial Court Order Modifying Joint Custody "Co-parenting Residential Arrangement"
Does Not Constitute Change of Custody, 13 Cal. Fain. L. Rep. (Adams & Sevitch) No. 9, at
4093, 4095 (Sept. 1989) [hereinafter Trial Court Order].
335. Id.
336. Id. The label here that stays the same is the initial grant of custody which, in the
Birnbaum case, was both joint legal and joint physical custody. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id.
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of Birnbaum),339 the role of the courts in custody disputes has now been
extended. This case has provided a new way for parents to come before
the court and change their custody orders. By avoiding the strict re-
quirements to modify custody orders, those cases that could not meet the
substantial change in circumstances requirement before this decision will
now be resolved under the change in "co-parenting residential arrange-
ment"3" theory instead. Thus, courts will be more involved in custody
disputes and minor changes in initial custody arrangements341 because
the Birnbaum court has granted the California judiciary broad power to
alter the time allocated to each parent under joint custody orders.
Courts apparently now have the authority to make decisions that affect
the daily lives of children,342 and in this way they take on the role of a
"super-parent. 34 3 Courts should not make the types of parental deci-
sions that should be left up to parents themselves to make. When parents
disagree, as did the Birnbaums, they should seek help through media-
tion. 3 4 Instead of improving the resolution of custody disputes, these
types of cases burden the com-ts with an unnecessary influx of complex
litigation. This litigation is complex especially because of the many psy-
chological and emotional aspects of child development. 4
There are also negative effects on the families themselves because of
the court's expanded role in this area. Switching timetables alone is not
the core of the problem; rather, the crux of the problem lies in the threat
of the possibility of a lawsuit continuing to disrupt family relationships.
The Birnbaum court itself explained that allocating equal amounts of
time with each parent is not the issue.346 The court noted that
"[p]arents' demands for equal amounts of a child's time constitute a dis-
service to the child, usually creating stress and preventing the child from
fully achieving his or her potential. '347 The court instead emphasized,
339. 211 Cal. App. 3d 1508, 260 Cal. Rptr. 210 (1989).
340. Id. at 1513, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 213.
341. The role of the court mediator will also become more important. Trial Court Order,
supra note 334, at 4095. Section 4607(e) of the California Civil Code provides that each
county may decide whether a mediator may make custody and visitation recommendations to
the court. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4607(e) (West Supp. 1990). The mediator, who does provides a
recommendation, may not be cross-examined regarding the basis for the opinion because that
information is treated as confidential and inadmissible. Id. § 4607(c).
342. See Birnbaum, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 1517-18, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 216; Rosson v. Rosson
(In re Marriage of Rosson), 178 Cal. App. 3d 1094, 1106, 224 Cal. Rptr. 250, 259 (1986).
343. Birnbaum, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 1517-18, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 216.
344. See infra note 351 for an explanation of mediation.
345. See supra note 296. See generally J. WALLERSTEIN & S. BLAKESLEE, supra note 56
(studies on effects of divorce on parents and children).
346. Birnbaum, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 1515-16, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 214-15.
347. Id.
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"Although time is important to the parents, the determining factor as to
whether joint physical custody is in the best interests of the child is the
nature of the parenting relationship between the parents." '34 8 No matter
how well judges handle contested custody hearings or how wisely they
decide, "at least one parent is sorely disappointed and the children are
inevitably traumatized by having to go through adversary court
processes. Worst of all the children are often in a position where pres-
sure exists to choose between parents, each of whom they love.' 349 The
post-dissolution family is fragile and, when adversary custody proceed-
ings occur, "this fragile structure falls apart like Humpty Dumpty and it
becomes impossible to put Humpty Dumpty together again."350 Child
custody cases should be decided by parents with the aid of family coun-
selors or psychologists and not the courts.351
348. Id. at 1517, 260 Cal Rptr. at 215. A recent report from the Center for the Family in
Transition in Main County has found no evidence that joint custody promoted the children's
adjustment to their parents' divorce. Joint Custody Findings, supra note 82, at 3630. The
center conducted two separate studies; the first considered families that chose their own cus-
tody arrangements; and the second considered families with extensive postdissolution conflict.
Id. The findings were as follows:
The first study found that there was no significant relationship between "access
arrangements" and the child's adjustment to the divorce; of greater importance were
the child's age, the presence or absence of parental depression and anxiety, and the
degree of physical and verbal aggression between the parents. The second study
found that, where divorce disputes were severe, children who had greater access to
both parents ...were more emotionally troubled and behaviorally disturbed.
Greater exposure to conflict between their parents made them more vulnerable to
being caught up and used in the disputes. The researcher cautioned against encour-
aging or mandating joint custody when parents are involved in an ongoing struggle.
Id. Dr. Judith Wallerstein, Executive Director of the Center, said that in order to maintain
continuous contact with both parents the child does not have to go back and forth between
homes. Id. She also said that "[w]hile joint custody may still be warranted in some cases,
these studies certainly don't show it to be the boon for kids that everyone hoped it would be."
Id.
349. Rosson, 178 Cal. App. 3d at 1106, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 259.
350. Id.
351. See Section 4607 of the California Civil Code which provides for mandatory mediation
proceedings. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4607(a) (West Supp. 1990). The section states in pertinent
part:In any proceeding where there is at issue the custody of or visitation with a minor
child, and where it appears on the face of the petition or other application for an
order or modification of an order for the custody or visitation of a child or children
that either or both such issues are contested, as provided in Section[s] 4600, 4600.1,
or 4601, the matter shall be set for mediation of the contested issues prior to or
concurrent with the setting of the matter for hearing.... [A] petition also may be
filed pursuant to this section for the mediation of a dispute relating to any existing
order for custody or visitation.... The purpose of the mediation proceeding shall be
to reduce acrimony which may exist between the parties and to develop an agreement
assuring the child or children's close and continuing contact with both parents. The
mediator shall use his or her best efforts to effect a settlement of the custody or
visitation dispute that is in the best interests of the child or children, pursuant to
Section 4608.
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VI. POSSIBLE REMEDIES
There are at least four alternatives to the Birnbaum approach which
would foster stable custody arrangements and protect the child's best in-
terests. First, the Birnbaum court could have determined the child's best
interests and based its decision on the existence of changed circumstances
alone. The court could have recognized an exception which would be
triggered only "when the noncustodial parent shows that custody has
remained unchanged but inadequate since its inception" and must prove
"only that a change is essential or at least expedient for the welfare of the
child in order to obtain custody."3 2 Such a limited exception would be
consistent with the primary purpose of the change in circumstances rule
and should be adopted. 3
Second, in the absence of such a judicially created exception, the
California legislature could adopt a detailed modification requirement
that would limit changes in custody. Under this alternative, the legisla-
ture would amend section 4600(i) to include:
Unless stipulated by the parties, no motion to modify a custody
judgment may be made earlier than two years after its date,
unless the court permits it to be made on the basis of affidavits
that there is reason to believe the child's present environment
may endanger seriously his physical, mental, moral or emo-
tional health.354
In addition to adopting this limited exception, the legislature should
Id. Trial judges find that a mediator's testimony about the child's best interests is significant
and invaluable in assistance to parents. See, ag., Rosson, 178 Cal. App. 3d at 1103-05, 224
Cal. Rptr. at 257-58. For a discussion of the mediation process, goals and benefits for parents
and children, see generally FLORENCE BIENENFIELD, CHILD CUSTODY MEDIATION (1983).
352. Burchard v. Garay, 42 Cal. 3d 531, 550, 724 P.2d 486, 499, 229 Cal. Rptr. 800, 813
(1986) (Mosk, J., concurring). The courts should be flexible in certain circumstances and not
apply so stringently the change in circumstances requirement. Although there are many
problems which arise because of the Birnbaum court's flexibility in deciding children's cus-
tody, there is some merit to this flexibility. Courts need to be flexible in custody arrangements
because the child-parent relationship and surrounding circumstances are constantly in flux.
Judges should use their discretion when making their decisions, and should consider that for
some children a change in the residential timetable or joint custody may be appropriate. This
flexibility must be weighed against the need for stability in the parenting environment for
children. If the court loosens these requirements to allow for changes in residential timetables,
initial custody orders would have no meaning since they could be changed immediately with
ease. To allow for this flexibility there needs to be a change in the entire way custody is
determined and this new trend should involve a final determination by both mediators and
psychologists.
353. Rosson, 178 Cal. App. 3d at 1106, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 259.
354. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 601(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990); accord KY. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 403.330(1) (Baldwin 1984 & Supp. 1990).
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specifically define all types of custody so that courts cannot use Birn-
baum to avoid the modification requirements, or invent another way to
get around these requirements. The definitions of joint custody should
explain the specific types of custody arrangements available, such as a
change in the co-parenting residential arrangements.355
Third, as a flexible remedy, the legislature could adopt paragraph
602.1 of the Illinois Revised Statute which defines joint custody as any
parenting arrangement that either parents agree upon or the courts or-
der.356 The parents must specify in writing all of their powers, rights and
responsibilities for the child as well as the procedures for any proposed
changes.357 In the event that the parents are unable to agree upon a joint
parenting plan, then the court under the statute will provide for specific
custody arrangements. 358 This statute would be beneficial because par-
ents would have flexibility in their joint custody arrangements, and chil-
dren would be assured stability in their home environment so that courts
could not modify the custody agreement at the whim of one parent
merely to change the residential timetables.
A fourth alternative would be for the legislature to modify sections
4600.5(d) and 4600(a) of the California Civil Code359 by adding the fol-
lowing language:
It is the public policy of this State in allowing modification of
custody orders to assure that minor children remain in a stable
environment, and that their custody arrangements or residen-
tial timetables are only altered when there is a substantial
change in circumstances. The purpose of this public policy is
to avoid vexatious litigation and the constant disruption of the
children's established mode of living.
VII. CONCLUSION
Birnbaum v. Birnbaum (In re Marriage of Birnbaum) 31 was de-
cided incorrectly and should not have been litigated. The court should
have followed the strict judicial rules governing modification and not
355. See supra note 282.
356. See, eg., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 602.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990); see infra note
282.
357. Id. This definition seems to encompass a variety of joint custody plans so that if the
Illinois statute were adopted, courts would not be able to modify joint custody so easily.
358. Id. See supra note 282 for a list of the types of arrangements courts or the parties
themselves may include in their parenting plan.
359. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4600.5(d), 4600(a) (West Supp. 1990).
360. 211 Cal. App. 3d 1508, 260 Cal. Rptr. 210 (1989).
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been so easily persuaded by the attorneys' briefs.361 This case did not
meet the test for modification and the court shohld not have invented
new ways to alter initial custody orders not provided for by statute.
Modification of child custody laws is a task properly left to the California
legislature. By circumventing the established case law and statutes in
this area, and ignoring the policies underlying child custody arrange-
ments,362 the Birnbaum court overstepped its bounds and laid the
groundwork for future ill-advised decisions in this area.
Most importantly, children should not be subject to their parents'
never-ending conflicts leading to these custody battles.363 It is in the best
interests of the child to remain in a stable environment 3' 6 so that the
effects of divorce are minimized. The Birnbaum decision allows parents
to shift the child back and forth between them. It does so by allowing
courts to resolve cases involving a change in residential timetables which
do not meet the modification requirements. This decision, therefore, al-
lows the continuation of vexatious litigation which only harms the child.
Rather than perpetuating the incessant instability suffered by the child
under Birnbaum, the courts should seek to minimize the detrimental ef-
fects of divorce, as they may linger on for years or even a lifetime after
the dissolution of a marriage.
Mara Quint Berke*
361. Respondent's Reply Brief at 16, Birnbaum v. Birnbaum (In re Marriage of Birnbaum),
211 Cal. App. 3d 1508, 260 Cal. Rptr. 210 (1989) (No. A0-40438).
362. See Burchard v. Garay, 42 Cal. 3d 531, 535, 724 P.2d 486, 488, 229 Cal. Rptr. 800,
802 (1986); Carney v. Carney (In re Marriage of Carney), 24 Cal. 3d 725, 730-31, 598 P.2d 36,
38, 157 Cal. Rptr. 383, 385 (1979); Connolly v. Connolly (In re Marriage of Connolly), 214
Cal. App. 2d 433, 436, 29 Cal. Rptr. 616, 617-18 (1963).
363. "[C]hildren involved in a custody proceeding should not be made the pawns of the
personal desires, either on the part of the contestants or the court, no matter how sincere such
desires may be." Juri v. Juri, 61 Cal. App. 2d 815, 819, 143 P.2d 708, 711 (1943).
364. See supra notes 284-312 and accompanying text.
* The Author wishes to thank both Professor Charlotte Goldberg for introducing her to
this subject and for inspiring her to write, and Professor Randy Kandel for her suggestions and
comments. This Note is dedicated to all members of my family for their endless support, love
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